Chapter 10
Networks and Commons: Bureaucracy, Collegiality and Organizational Morphogenesis in the Struggles to Shape Collective Responsibility in New Sharing Institutions

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Towards New Commons in a Bureaucratized Society

The current context for human flourishing is bleak: global warming and major extinctions caused by human action, triggering mass migrations, complex wars and the spread of global destructive capacity. Triumphant and ruthless capitalism armed with large bureaucracies (i.e. control, rationalization, technocracy and efficiency in mass and routine production), deregulated markets and a productivist growth mystique has led to predatory exploitation of the environment, to concentration of powers and to extreme levels of inequality in all domains. For example, the institutional framework of contemporary capitalist economies has been strongly influenced by liberalization policies initiated in the late 1970s: financialization of the economy, privatization of public services and withdrawal of the state, development of widespread, multilevel anormative regulation (Archer 2016). The prospect of being short of time for the transition to different kinds of societies, if not of big calamities and/or self-destruction by humanity going about its business as usual, is no longer fiction.

These contemporary challenges should lead to deep changes in civilizations. In other words they require institutional changes to begin with. Economists propose ever more markets to deal with the problem. There are not enough property rights on watersheds, biodiversity or traditional knowledge, for example, and therefore people do not care about them, overexploit them freely or let them disappear. Bring in more individual property rights. The market value for such goods will help individual or corporate owners price them properly and eventually protect them. Governments should make sure their dozy civil servants stay awake to regulate the quality and use

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of these goods. Prices and inequalities will decrease, quality will increase, and of course this would not depend upon who governs. The purpose of this chapter is not to criticize this strange music that the world has listened to for too long. It is to ask whether sociologists can be more useful in thinking about institutional changes that are needed to manage local and global commons. For example, how such changes will be morphostatic or morphogenetic (Archer 2013), and why.

For current societies, a drastic decrease in the amounts of many kinds of resources for an increasing number of people, with growing inequalities in access and hoarding of opportunities, will make sharing increasingly difficult, even for non-rival goods. Bureaucratic mass markets having failed, who will survive which restrictions in energy, water, food and forests, as well as all the indirect costs that will come attached to such restrictions and/or the long list of horrendous events listed above? Many still believe in/hope for technological innovation as a possible solution for a smooth transition. But it is obvious that even with technological innovation, social innovation will be necessary. Social structures built for periods of growth and limitless resources will disappear. For the many the stakes are high. The proportion of losers in these upcoming changes is so high that the usual techniques for adaptation to incremental changes will probably not work. Deregulated markets may well be replaced by centrally -if not militarily- enforced quotas and parametrized commons. A great number and variety of new institutions, for example new forms of adaptable commons –including knowledge commons (Ostrom 1990; Hess and Ostrom 2007)– are needed, that can resist all sorts of enclosures and exclusivism and define their own form of collective responsibility.

The definition of commons used here refers to both shared resources in which members of a community have an equal interest, including the common pool resource institutions (Ostrom 1990) that are needed to manage these shared resources. Beyond Ostrom's formal approach, this institution includes the social rationality and the social capital on which this institution must count for its rules and conventions actually to work. Social rationality is encapsulated in shared kinds of appropriateness judgments (Lazega 1992) and the social capital of the community combines the social processes that help members manage the dilemmas of their collective actions (Lazega 2006): these social processes include bounded solidarity and exclusions, socialization and collective learning, social control and conflict resolution, and regulation and institutionalization (Lazega 2003). This social capital is shared by the members as a form of concrete social discipline that they recognize as legitimate. In this approach, common pool resource institutions can be local, or extend beyond the local, across boundaries, as in the case of the environmental commons or knowledge commons.

It may well be that militaristic responses of ruthless authoritarian regimes controlled by small coopted elites with their own private armies will help the few in managing freely their own commons and subject the many and their commons to destructive forms of collective responsibility. After all, the nation States have not been able to react to global financial crises in efficient and credible ways. They may not be able to manage worse crises, such as big environmental ones, more efficiently. This chapter looks at the possibility of a different solution, one that recognizes the many and their commons that are in danger of being left out of the system. It looks

at how the rights of the many may be redefined – without idealizing future sharing institutions that may also be remote-controlled bureaucratically, and heavily taxed, by the predatory few.

The scenario is the following. Survival requires institutional changes. Among such changes, the bottom-up emergence of new cooperatives and commons became a legitimate goal at the level of the planet, and officially recognized by the United Nations at the turn of the twenty-first century. The number of organizations, public and/or private, set up for local collective management and collective responsibility in sharing scarce (re-)collectivised resources is increasing in most societies. Such commons operate based on what sociology calls collegiality, building on committee systems and consensus work among peers but also on diverse forms of social discipline that are considered legitimate by participants. These forms come attached to collective responsibility that is based on using personalized relationships to manage the dilemmas of collective action (Lazega 2001). Collegiality as an organizational form is based on self-governing by personalized relationships. The specific social discipline of collective responsibility that come attached to this organizational form have been described, for example, among professionals (lawyers, scientists, judges, priests, etc.). They have been studied in relation to collective action where tasks are non-routine (Waters 1989). In this form, which is not democratic,[1] coordination is carried out by 'peers' evaluating each other's legitimacy and governing themselves using networks and social capital defined as a set of social processes[2] (solidarity, control, socialization, regulation) facilitating collective action, all based on 'relational infrastructures'[3] (niches and status) (Lazega 2003, 2015a, b) and measured by social networks (Lazega 2001, 2012, 2016).

Indeed, as any form of commons is about collective self-management and sharing of collective resources, the outlook on such institutional changes is a neo-structural and organizational perspective on collective action (Lazega 1994). To measure and model the social capital of the collective, it is necessary to reason beyond 'embeddedness' studied in Granovetter's sense (1985). In organized settings, participation in non-routine collective action – for example, for team production, regulatory activity, or enforcement of previous agreements – requires personalized cooperation with others. This cooperation is expressed through personalized transfers/sharing or exchanges of various kinds of resources, as well as in commitments to exchange partners. These resources include, for example, information, coworkers' goodwill, advice, sometimes emotional support, and many other means that can serve individual and collective ends. From a neo-structural perspective, this means that

[1]"There is absolutely nothing 'democratic' about collegiality. When the privileged classes had to guard themselves against the threat of those who were negatively privileged, they were always obliged to avoid, in this way, allowing any monocratic, seigneurial power that might count on those strata to arise" (Weber 1978:362; see also Musselin 1990).

[2]For social capital as a set of relational processes and capacity for collective action, in particular for managing the conflicts and dilemmas of collective action, see Lazega (2001, 2006).

[3]For analytical definitions and methodological procedures to identify relational infrastructures in empirical work, see for example Lazega (2001, 2016).

specific local (uniplex or multiplex) sub-structures of social ties must be organized so that members can cooperate and exchange on an ongoing basis. Such cooperation is not based on purely moral virtue but on personalized interdependencies and the need to manage them strategically even in highly conflictual situations.

Creating a form of social discipline that is considered legitimate by actors relies on the stimulation of a social rationality[4] without which the fundamental social processes enabling collective action and the management of its conflicts and dilemma are meaningless for members involved. Social discipline characterizes both the individual and the collective level of agency. From the point of view of the individual, social discipline is the ability of actors to self-restrict themselves in the course of their negotiation with others, in the definition of their own individual interest and the scope of its claims, as well as in the exercise of their own individual power – notably their power to exploit. This self-restriction is an outcome of the politicization of exchanges in the relational infrastructures. Social niches and endogenous forms of status are structural forms that directly contribute to the management of interdependencies, to hoarding opportunities and to the durability of inequality. But they can also facilitate social mechanisms that help members manage the dilemmas of their collective actions in the organizational society. It is important to know that creation and maintenance of relational infrastructures (niches and status) trigger changes in social processes downstream, including regulation and institutionalization.

One of the ways in which the question of the nature of this social discipline can be addressed is by acknowledging that such changes take place in an organizational society that has been structured by two centuries of Weberian bureaucratization, i.e. governing by routinization of tasks (including by technology), hierarchy, valuation of impersonal work relationships, use of organizations as "tools with a life of their own" (Selznick 1949). This question can thus be translated into another: What kind of combination of this bureaucracy -the default organizational form- and forms of collegiality emerging with new commons can we expect? What is the nature of the interactions between bureaucracy and collegiality when solving particular problems of collective action and collective responsibility. How do these organizational forms mix and interact? Two kinds of combinations of these ideal-typical organizational forms have been examined empirically: Collegial boards of directors and executive teams at the top of (large) bureaucracies, and professional collegial pockets within large bureaucracies (Bosk 1979; Freidson 1986; Lazega and Wattebled 2011). Here I argue that bureaucracy and collegiality could drive each other's evolution in ways that may turn out to be morphegenetic in the sense defined by Archer (1995, 2013, 2015). In order to contribute to understanding these dynamics this chapter looks at an example of one articulation between bureaucracy and collegiality, leaving open the question of whether institutional changes ahead will indeed be morphogenetic.

[4]See Lazega (1992, 2014a) about the specificity of this social rationality, i.e. actors' reflexive and critical ability to contextualize their behaviour using appropriateness judgements that endogenize social structure and allow for building a real rapport with institutions, becoming institutional entrepreneurs experimenting with new solutions to the dilemmas of collective action.

Analyzing a potentially morphogenetic struggle between two organizational forms could help in trying to figure out what new sharing and taxing institutions may look like in the future. In particular, the collegiality of the commons of the many will have to interact with centralized bureaucracies dominated by the few and controlling the channelling of resources to local commons – if such a channelling takes place for co-optation purposes. Knowledge of these interactions may be useful when the many will try to protect themselves from the list of horrendous calamities detailed above by setting up new commons that may not be functional, viable and efficient if they do not interact in new ways with these centralized bureaucracies managed by the elites. The fact that common resources will be taxed by a centralized macro - level bureaucratic system raises the issue of effectiveness when the commons will in fact represent resistance of the many against the bureaucratic and military tools of the few.

Indeed the kind of collegial organization that many all too often idealize (in spite of the damages that hyper-personalized work relationships can create (Sainsaulieu 1977), including conflicts of interests, patronage and clientelism) and aspire to to some degree, is continually crowded out by markets and States (Lazega and Mounier 2002). One of the potentially tragic ironies here is that members often do not like the discipline of collegial organizations and are attracted to markets as a promise of escaping from this discipline. But they do so at the cost of exhausting the social capital and social trust that produce an alternative to the military path: from a sociological perspective, market emancipation and overkill can eventually lead to such a military path being taken. By the time we are facing this market plus/vs military question, might there be enough little seeds planted to help a cooperative third way, or balancing alternative, to emerge?

Answering this question requires, at the very least, a minimal grasp of what could be called organizational morphogenesis. It is interesting to use the model of collegiality to look at how the commons will be organized, and to try to reach that grasp, because collegiality is dual: it is both a specific organizational form and a tool for bureaucratic management. My purpose is to show that forms of collegial commons in an organizational society (that is already bureaucratized) help us think about morphogenesis. It is the endless struggle between collegiality and bureaucracy in framing social life that may be morphogenetic. An organizational approach to morphogenesis is proposed in which each model cannot exist without the other and in which the two models -that are actually two levels of collective agency (Lazega 2015b)- drive each other's evolution.

Collegiality: A Specific Form of Organization and a Tool for Bureaucratic Management

Organizations that coordinate the activities of peers, often experts and professionals, called upon to make decisions in situations of uncertainty and who spend much of their time accomplishing non-routine tasks, still represent a basic problem in mainstream sociology of organizations today. Max Weber's most systematic

writings on the issue are centered on collegiality and are to be found, in the core of *Economy and Society*, at the end of the chapter on bureaucracy and in the section on division of powers in the chapter on types of legitimate domination. Those pages reflect his theory that rationalization and bureaucratization best characterize modernity and the specificity of the exercise of power and domination in modern societies. Weber presents collegiality as a managerial device, one tool among others, for bureaucratic rational-legal authority. The device consists in bringing experts together to work in committees, requiring from them that they build consensus and come to an agreement. The Prince or head of a bureaucratic organization applies that method to avoid depending on a single expert or on experts in general – whose authority they fear – and to test their loyalty and competence. At the same time, collegiality can also become a mitigating force in the face of a potentially arbitrary or autocratic, "monocratic" power.

Original neo-Weberian theses have recently listed an ensemble of formal characteristics that challenge this Weberian view of collegiality. They separate a collegial and "polycratic" form of organization from the bureaucratic and monocratic model and argue that collegiality is a fully fledged organizational form, not only a managerial device in the hands of the bureaucrat (Waters 1989). Such organizations use and implement theoretical knowledge. Their members are considered professionals and their careers divided into a minimum of two steps – apprenticeship and practice. Though performance-minded, these organizations encounter difficulties when obliged to evaluate and compare the quality of their specialists' performance, thus resolving to place them formally on an equal footing. The organizations exert formal self-control and are thus, to a large extent, self-regulating. They create at least one forum, the committee of the whole – that may rely on the input of a more or less complex and hierarchical system of committees and sub-committees – where decision-making is collective.

Waters' approach to the collegial form of organization remains a formal one. The neo-Weberian perspective also produced a theory of collective action among peers that accounts for the social discipline and collective responsibility observed in those entities (Lazega 2001). This social discipline helps rival but interdependent partners, who carry out non-routine tasks and manage the dilemmas of their collective action together. This cooperation among competitors is based on the uneasy management of personalized relationships and multiplex social exchanges among strategic individuals and sub-groups. Collegiality depends upon personalized relationships which, in the standard bureaucratic model, are considered "particularistic" obstacles to collective action (Perrow 1986). In an ideal-typical, collegial organization those personalized ties become, on the contrary, the source of a social discipline that helps close/distant members exchange, monitor, exert pressure, sanction each other, select leaders, or yet again negotiate precarious values for self-regulation.

The sociology of organizations has thus produced at least two approaches, one according to Weber's theory, whereby collegiality is defined as a means of bureaucratic management; the other according to neo-Weberian theory, where it is defined as an organizational form *per se*. Therefore, how the two approaches can coexist is a question that arises both in theory and in practice. The Weberian

point of view is destined to evolve. In large bureaucracies, aside from the often collegial-like behavior of many top executives (Baylis 1989), the accent placed on cooperation between experts, the elimination of several hierarchical levels, or the generalization of project management have given rise to new work environments which promote what a bureaucrat might call "collegial pockets" characterized by the social mechanisms of survival and cooperation among peers.

The neo-Weberian point of view also evolves. It recognizes that the formal and social features of a collegial organization are precisely ideal-typical, like those of classical bureaucracies. Since routine and non-routine tasks are, in contemporary organizations and institutions, most often inextricably linked (Lazega 1993), bureaucracy and collegiality coexist in all modern structures of decision-making. In fact they do more than coexist. I argue that they challenge each other constantly, stimulating constant change in each other's implementation. The coexistence of both definitions of collegiality, one idealtypical, one empirical, indicates that collegiality and bureaucracy develop in a permanent if often unobtrusive, multilevel conflict, *i.e.* the result of a struggle between the top and bottom levels of an organization that brings together members who carry out non-routine tasks – whether in executive rooms where political negotiations are impossible to routinize or in collegial pockets of interdependent professionals and experts when they carry out work and cooperation that cannot be standardized.

As an example, this chapter looks at one possible combination of bureaucracy and collegiality in a Catholic diocese. This diocese is a bureaucracy in which the bishop is the absolute master of his organization. But the diocese cannot be seen exclusively as a bureaucracy. It is also a collegial setting because the priests consider each other as peers and are driven by different religious orientations and senses of professionalism. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, if a bishop does not try to understand how each of his priests is motivated by his *Beruf* or calling, the latter may simply leave.

Combining Bureaucracy and Collegiality in a Roman Catholic Diocese

Our setting is one of the largest Catholic dioceses in France. A diocese – which in France corresponds to a *département* – is a complex organization (Granfield 1988) with fuzzy borders due to the great number of associations, movements and groups that gravitate around it. It is composed of bureaucratically organized local communities complete with administrators, committees and a multitude of services all concentrated in one spot, the diocese. It is headed by a bishop nominated by the bishops of the given province and appointed by the Pope, Bishop of Rome. We think that it is possible to illustrate the conflict between bureaucracy and collegiality, i.e. managers and professionals, by the way the Roman Catholic Church, one of the most ancient and complex organizations in the Western world, functions; it should be added that the principle of collegiality among priests has no theological foundation.

It is no longer possible to describe a clerical organization of this type *before* it became a bureaucracy using Malcolm Waters' formal criteria. We will therefore examine how, in this diocese, collegiality as a form of organization was discernible in a collegial form of social discipline, both in the priests' various pastoral practices and in the organizational pressures of a bottom-up type that they create for collective action. This becomes possible if part of the priest's pastoral activity is understood as a form of expertise in specialized domains connected to various groups of believers (Gannon 1971). We will then proceed like archaeologists, looking for the markers of collegiality in an emerging structure (already partly redefined by the hierarchy) by analyzing their social networks. Analyzing the many areas of interdependencies and social exchange in a population of priests belonging to the same diocese reveals how part of the system of interrelations thus unveiled was organized according to a division of labor implying religious "orientations", among which it is difficult to establish any particular order and where the role of the Catholic chain of command is also somewhat wobbly. The social organization of the diocese, examined here exclusively from the priests' point of view, displays characteristics of a collegial organization, *i.e.* a specific organizational form. The fact that priests dedicated to different orientations interrelate makes it possible to build a consensus. All these elements substantiate that a bottom-up type of collegiality among priests exists.

But the Roman Catholic Church is also a bureaucracy in which the bishop, as an absolute master of his diocese, retains most of the power; his authority is monocratic in theory. Formally speaking, his power can be curbed from above, since the Bishop of Rome and the Roman Curia have the capacity to intervene should a disagreement arise (Gellard 1977; Schilling 2002; Vallier 1969); as well as – since Vatican II – from below through the councils, particularly with respect to finances (i.e. the existence of the Diocesan Council for economic affairs). It is the bishop's duty to appoint at least one Vicar General to assist him in directing the diocese. He is relatively free to organize the diocese as he sees fit, concerning, for instance, the meetings of the Episcopal Council, an equivalent to the "executive" power in the diocese. We shall be looking at the system of committees set up by the bishop in top-down fashion to cope with the pressures emanating from below that do not leave him much choice as to who should sit on those committees if he doesn't want his diocese to explode.

Let us start by describing priests' work, its routine and non-routine sides, the group of priests observed, and the variety of Catholic orientations they invent in order to adapt to their different clienteles – and the problems of identity and unity such diversity stirs up within the Church.[4] Seen through the eyes of the priests, collegiality represents a way to coordinate their activities, permitting the religious orientation they promised to create and represent to be built up, recognized and appreciated. We will next see how, since Vatican II, the bureaucratic organization of the Catholic Church has reintroduced elements of collegiality – such as the system of councils that frame the bishop's decision-making processes within the diocese or the creation of national Episcopal conferences. We shall describe how the Catholic hierarchy conceives of collegiality, institutionalizing and using it *à la* Weber, as a tool for management.

Bottom-Up Collegiality: Using Relations as Self-Management Tools

A neo-Weberian approach to collegiality begins with a description of actors' complex and uncertain work and the fact that they must collaborate in order to get a job done. A priest's activity occupies a double register, each of which creates specific conflicts and interdependencies: a relatively standardized, generalist register and a specialized register. The latter is the result both of the personal convictions at the root of a specific commitment and of the fact that a church is split into several religious orientations aimed at integrating different Catholic identities (Béraud 2006; Charles 1986; Gannon 1979a, b; Hervieu-Léger 2003; and Villemin and Caillot 2001). The specialized register opens up the possibility of bottom-up collegiality among priests. Individually, the diversity of persuasions and norms invested in their pastoral activity makes it difficult for them to accept a purely bureaucratic integration. Collectively, dividing pastoral activity into several different religious orientations makes it difficult for a monocratic authority to monopolize pastoral leadership. In this register, interdependencies between priests are more complex, more personal and collegial than in a generalist, impersonal and bureaucratic register. The various religious orientations that will be presented below – *activist*, *ritual* and *intellectual* for the main part – illustrate the variety of a priest's expertise and commitments and may explain the plurality of Catholic identities noted in and between parishes (Courcy 1999).

Priests' Pastoral Activity: The Collegial Construction of Religious Orientations

Generally speaking, the notion of "pastoral" work is vague and used for a multitude of activities which have no obvious relation to each other (Béraud 2006). Its collective and pragmatic side is in contrast to the "spiritual" and theological side. We defined it operationally as the activity that elaborates and implements all sorts of projects connected to a set of social and religious observances, aiming to religiously socialize and integrate all or part of a community – to uphold or reveal its religious specificity with respect to the behavior and significance of the non-religious environment. There is an intellectual dimension to that activity that turns it into what might be called "practical theology".

In our study, we considered that one of the main areas of uncertainty distinctive of a priest's work involves the relationship between the Catholic Church and its social environment: how to stop "exculturation" (Hervieu-Léger 2003) or, conversely, how to establish a possibly positive interaction with that society. In that respect, the most important resource in a diocese is the capacity to produce a "rational and systematic" discourse in which the diocese and French society intersect with a set of pastoral projects. Such discourse, rounded out by projects for secular as well as spiritual

activities, aimed at believers as well as potential Catholics, is the raw material from which consensus is made. Discourses and projects rest on the identification of religious "needs", thought to be difficult to guess in advance and perhaps different according to the social group involved. Such discourse produces various religious orientations through which the diversity of Catholic identities noted among priests belonging to the same diocese is also expressed. Due to the complexity and variety of pastoral activities (Goudet 1997; Palard 1985), it is difficult for a monocratic authority and a hierarchy to control the many registers of an individual priest's activities, which also explains why it is impossible to prevent bottom-up collegiality from taking shape.

The notion of "religious orientation" refers to the principle of an internal division between competing approaches to pastoral activities. An orientation cannot be reduced to a segment of a 'catholic market' for parishioners. It is also the basis for these priests' commitment and expectations, for their conception of themselves and of their church. Between 1998 and 2001, we identified three different orientations – ritual, activist and intellectual – themselves stemming from two other orientations that had become nearly extinct: Catholic action directed at independent occupations and a specific orientation directed at the working class (*prêtres ouvriers*). Those orientations are part of distinct, historically ancient traditions updated at the local level and by the contemporary situation of each individual diocese. The plurality of religious orientations is not solely linked to religious logics. It also depends on the diversity of the groups of believers and their social evolution: for example the development of highly under-privileged urban areas (*banlieues*), and the disappearance of traditional working-class neighborhoods, the transformation of middle class attitudes to politics, or the quest for social distinction among the well-off bourgeoisie.

A *ritual orientation* typically reintroduces elements considered traditional into the religious activity of a parish (especially 'Adoration of the Blessed Sacrament'). This links up with young people's desire for religious leadership (*e.g.* the European scout movement), the demand for a Catholic identity in global society and implementing evangelical projects to recruit new worshippers. Among young priests, the three aspects are combined with emphasizing the emotional dimension clearly apparent in their affective involvement and resort to charismatic groups. The orientation conveys the vision of priest as holy leader looking to control and circumscribe discussion within a local community, particularly by making private confession a priority. The ritualists maintain ties to priests in charge of traditionalist associations.

An *intellectual orientation* is promoted by another group of priests who recruit, coach and collaborate more with lay persons than the priests representing the ritual orientation. Since World War II, it has been part of a permanent undertaking to discredit the pious form of Catholic identification and promote a thoughtful and liberal adhesion to Catholicism through theological learning. In the confrontation with contemporary thought, it suggests that Christian faith should be expressed in intellectually acceptable terms. Contrary to what prevails in the "*pastorale* of independent occupations" (from which it seems to have stemmed), the political

dimension and sense of solidarity have evaporated to give way to the notion of believers finding fulfillment in their family and professional lives. The orientation is accompanied by a strong rationalization of pastoral activity (the project-based approach dissociating the organizational and the spiritual, a more sophisticated division of labour). Claiming a specific position for the priest, though still not fully guaranteed, is clearly pushed to the fore, at least his place as "intellectual leader and manager", and arbitrator in the definition of parish priorities.

The *militant* or *activist orientation* underscores the role of local communities in working-class contexts with high unemployment. This activist orientation is represented by priests who work in the *banlieues*. The oldest among them know the bishop directly. Their starting point is the observation that the pastoral and the social are united, which is prominent when giving priority to social intervention projects and inciting members of the congregation to participate in volunteer associations, religious or not. The idea is to claim Christian identity from that angle by being acknowledged as a social partner. It is also the starting point for a parallel activity aiming to enter into partnerships with local groups. A second perspective consists in provoking encounters with other religious groups, including communities of recent migrants, in particular Muslims, in order to clarify Christian identity. Putting the accent on lay responsibility, these priests constantly seek to downplay their own leadership and exploit the discrepancy between their own words and the traditional image of the priest. They stress their role as quasi social workers who work with many lay persons, almost *as* lay persons. Among them, the priests representing the catholic action in working class milieu (*prêtres ouvriers*) personify a shrinking orientation (in numbers), and they are slightly different in political discourse from the other militants, although the two are both activists and quite close. They stress catholic action oriented mainly towards very low revenue workers and the unemployed and their families.

Bottom-up collegiality among priests is based on the diversity of their commitments and on their need to jointly transform them into locally credible religious orientations and pastoral projects. The orientations reflect the fractioning of a diocesan clergy, thereby better able to respond to and socialize part of the several Catholic identities present. Bottom-up collegiality organizes cooperation between interdependent priests building up their religious orientations locally and wanting to remain in control of them. The top-down creation of the presbyteral council towards the end of the 1960s formally translated the hierarchy's reaction to that observable fact. At stake in this collegiality is the preservation of privileges, *i.e.*, in the present case, defending the specific authority of the priest with regard to lay people as much as with respect to the bishop.

Each of them represents a well known (to specialists in the sociology of religions) religious orientation, but also a social niche. These priests actually do not much like other priests defending a different kind of meaning and orientation. They criticize each other plentifully and many do not talk to each other. The question is therefore how does the bishop maintain some kind of social order in this institution which is so segmented and potentially so conflictual. The bishop's strategy is to identify in each of these groups/niches the most vocal persons, the priests who have some kind

of status in their social niche, and invite these 'representatives' to become members of the episcopal committee. In exchange for participation in running the diocese from this committee they have to agree not to develop any form of oppositional solidarity or criticize each other in public. For example, the militant activists need to shut up about the traditionalists and the other way around. In exchange for this co-optation, the bishop does not want to hear any (collegially familiar) bickering that gets personal and destructive very quickly between opposed social niches – thus avoiding organizational drift. Observing exchanges between priests in their specific organizational context is a good way to grasp specific dimensions of bottom-up collegial organization, for it brings to light the relations existing in their specific social discipline and relational infrastructures, and thus in the joint production of their respective pastoral orientations.

The Relational Structure of the System of Social Exchange Among Priests

Our representation of the priests' exchange system illustrates the workings of bottom-up collegiality quite clearly. Before going into the details, it is necessary to present the general characteristics of the links we observed and the nature of the social resources exchanged.[5] The priests interviewed declared on the average 15.2 partners for collaboration, 5 partners for advice, between 6 and 7 for conviviality and 3 for personal support, with a considerable standard deviation (Wattebled 2004). Relations for possible teamwork involved, for example, collaborating within the same parish or deanery, or with the bishop's vicar to set up a parish team, or participating in a committee of the Presbyteral Council or yet again meeting with the person in charge of sacred art and liturgy to get a church altar ready. Counseling sometimes touched upon the same domains and involved sensitive issues (organizing the parish, celebrating the sacraments, resolving a conflict). In general, advice was sought out from members of the hierarchy or from members of a common social niche, or from other colleagues in the same deanery. Conviviality hardly ever respects the pecking order; rather it looks for groups where there is personal affinity, or a deanery, or yet again it entails outside relations. Personal support mainly combines hierarchical circles and personal affinity groups, as well as ties that extend beyond the established formal boundaries.

The system of social exchange between priests is sketched in Fig. 10.1. Within the context of a diocese and considering priests' relationships, a social niche can be defined as a space for dense exchanges that combines different sorts of resources: sharing advice, conviviality and personal support among priests with

[5]For a detailed presentation of the network study of this diocese and neo-structural analyses, see Wattebled (2004) and Lazega and Wattebled (2011).



Fig. 10.1 Collegial pockets and linchpins in a bureaucratic structure: Religious orientations of the priests in a Diocese as mapped on their advice network

similar relational profiles and common attributes.[6] Local consensus develops among them and is maintained around a religious orientation. Activities are evaluated and members given credit for these activities by their peers. A social niche is thus also composed of teams of priests – whether informal or affiliated to a national or even international association (for a training period, collaborating in a journal, or even organizing a seminar). One nevertheless observes a trend among young priests at the time to constitute only informal, "unaffiliated" groups; in doing so, they are mainly espousing generational and pastoral affinities.

Legend: Representation of the advice network among the priests in the diocese. The size of the nodes represents the centrality of the priest in this network. Priests represented by white circles are uncommitted in terms of orientation. The three most central light grey rounded squares are the "linchpins", i.e. most central priests with an uncontroversial, declining 'Catholic orientation towards independent occupations', high popularity among the peripheral and uncommitted (in terms of orientation) priests, and high hierarchical positions close to the bishop. The white squares with a cross represent an intellectual orientation. The triangles represent activist priests, i.e. black upgoing triangles for priests sharing a militant orientation, and black downgoing triangles for priest sharing a working class orientation. The black squares represent the priests with the ritual orientation. For an interpretation of this structure, refer to the text.

Studying the bishop's formal system of integration does not mean that he cannot use less formal mechanisms, *e.g.* drawing on his own personal network. But since

[6]For the sake of clarity, Fig. 10.1 is built on the advice network among priests, but the other relationships measured in the diocese reflect the same underlying pattern, although in a more complexified way (Wattebled 2004; Lazega and Wattebled 2011). Centrality is measured as eigenvector centrality, a measurement that weighs the centrality of the person by the centrality of the contacts choosing that person. Highly central priests in this picture are priests who are sought out for advice by priests who are themselves sought out for advice. This measure represents with relatively good precision the pecking order between the priests as observed ethnographically.

the bishop did not wish to answer the network questionnaire, we are only able to examine the formal integration of the collegial pockets system. In the case in hand, the bishop did not originally come from the diocese; he had been installed recently and had little personal contact with the priests, which accounts for the important place occupied by the *Vicaire épiscopal*'s relations, himself being chosen for that position by the bishop because of his extensive familiarity with the priests.

The exchange system is organized in a series of social niches where each niche can be connected to a religious orientation. The system translates into an informal division of labour among priests. Three facets of the priests' activities explain these interconnections and the interdependencies between social niches in this system of niches. In the first place, redefining norms for religious activity and diocesan priorities requires building and maintaining consensus, even temporary. To do so, the social niches must not function separately and, as we mentioned above, priests must be able to extend their contacts beyond their own social niche in order to be able to operate as intermediaries or even spokesmen to the bishop. Secondly, the religious orientations described above prove complementary, addressing different populations of parishioners and in the end accounting for the diversity in the diocese. It is difficult for a bishop to choose among the different orientations and give precedence to one without running the risk of cutting himself off from a large part of the faithful, among whom the priests themselves. The fact that the priests fit into a system of social niches shows how complementary they are indeed and keeps the expression of radical beliefs and convictions in check. Lastly, young priests in particular share the desire to preserve the specific quality of their commitments which, as a collective concern, is likely to reinforce cohesion among priests beyond differences in pastoral and theological sensitivities. The bishop tries to deffuse the oppositions/conflicts between these constituencies by coopting members from all of them.

To understand the relational pattern in this system, it is also important to realize that it combines in quite a complex way a system of niches with a core-periphery structure. In this system the main social niches (each representing an orientation) represent the components of a semi-periphery in this core-periphery structure. In this core-periphery system, the core has representatives of several social niches, each representing an orientation/constituency (Wattebled 2004; Lazega and Wattebled 2011). In this pattern, we find the five main orientations present in the diocese, i.e. ritual, intellectual, militant, as well as the declining catholic action in independent milieux and catholic action in working class milieux. This informal division of pastoral work could only be identified by network analysis of the personal relationships of the priests among themselves. Priests developing the same orientation find themselves clustered in the same position because they share a common relational profile and have strong relationships with each other (which is the definition of a social niche).

However, as shown in Fig. 10.1, the most central members are priests who are administratively closest to the bishop and who often represent the declining orientation of the "catholic action in independent milieu". To understand this paradoxical situation it is important to add to the picture two additional characteristics of the diocese. Firstly, many priests are 'peripheral' in these networks: their relational

capital is quite modest, they do not belong in any social niche and do not declare any specific orientation. These 'peripheral' priests tend to seek advice from the colleagues who represent older and declining –but uncontroversial– orientations. Three representatives of one of these declining orientations, precisely the catholic action in independent milieu, are the largest nodes in Fig. 10.1, who "benefit" from this situation. They are the *Vicaire general* and two *Vicaires épiscopaux* who owe their centrality to their administrative contribution and to the fact that they represent an unthreatening orientation; they are powerful individually but represent a spent force collectively. Secondly, it is important to know that the bishop himself had a militant and intellectual sensitivity. In order to pacify the milieu, he needed as deputies priests representing such an uncontroversial orientation. He found them, at the time and in this case, in these representatives of the catholic action in independent milieu. Structurally speaking these three persons became the linchpins or pivots of the structure. They were in a position to be trusted by the bishop and the many peripheral priests, as well as to remain on speaking terms with the traditionalists, intellectual and militants, i.e. the orientations that were the most creative in terms of adaptation to the environment, but also generating the tensions in the diocese. This linchpin position is thus complex; it is a mix of unthreatening popularity among the 'unaligned', brokerage between the 'aligned', and proximity to the bishop who backs them up while keeping them under close supervision.

The Endogenous Emergence of Heterogeneous Forms of Status Among the Priests

Developing cooperation among priests depends on a complex social discipline. But if each social niche becomes meaningful only within the broader system of niches, that is due to the fact that social discipline is not exclusively "local" and based on accomplishing presbyteral tasks: representatives of a pastoral orientation are in contact with colleagues who share the same commitments in other parishes and other dioceses. A reinforced allegiance to the bishop – a conception of the holy office shared by all the faithful and of the presbyteral office shared by all the priests – is also part of the social discipline typical of bottom-up collegiality among priests. Within the diocese, the priest is no longer looking to establish a local status (an attitude considered too "parochial") especially since, as of the 1970s, he has received his assignment for a limited period of time only. "Diocesan priests" theoretically occupy an intermediate position between the diocese represented by the bishop and the parishes mainly run by laymen and laywomen. That position incites them to try and create a diocesan status for themselves and aim for a formal title. Given the increasingly complex nature of pastoral activity and greater specialization of religious work, the large number of diocesan responsibilities – and small number of priests – this compels the latter to compete for those titles.

It is not easy to analyze status competition among priests: the subject does not explicitly appear in discourse (where it is censored by the values of fraternity

and consensus), nor is it explicitly mentioned in the exchanges that they declared. As in the case of the three linchpins, we managed to analyze it by considering the priest in his position of middleman seeking to build a status for himself and having it acknowledged in the diocese and parishes. When analyzing priests' speech and exchanges, three levels appear to co-exist: the local level corresponds to the priest's traditional desire to make a place for himself at the heart of the parish community. Being appointed to a different parish threatens that place for he must rebuild it from scratch in a new community. The diocesan level includes that dimension: it supposes recognition of and commitment to diocesan preoccupations and consequently means lesser local commitment benefiting extra-parish exchanges with colleagues or lay people who have diocesan responsibilities in projects or councils. The extra-diocesan level concerns priests investing in activities or aiming for titles outside the diocese (the bishopry, a regional or national responsibility, academic notoriety). Each time, accessing a higher level in this multilevel structure demands a more selective reorganization of contacts at the lower level.

When considering the relational data collected – more exactly the centrality scores obtained by the priests in each exchange network – it is possible to calculate correlations, determine the degree to which the scores converge and identify forms of status (consistent or not). As suggested by the linchpins, rather than seeing a single chain of command emerging because of all the social resources being concentrated in the same hands, several profiles emerge when we combine our analysis of the exchange system and the priests' centrality scores. In the first place, members of the hierarchy, who all naturally have diocesan responsibilities, are very central in collaboration, advice and personal support. They declare few or no pastoral projects, having no parish appointment or if they do, doubtless no time to develop many. Secondly, about ten young priests are central in the different exchange systems, more especially for advice and particularly in their own social niche. Being identified with a religious orientation, they declare a large number of well-defined pastoral projects. They call themselves and are often called spokesmen ("loud-mouths") in the diocese. Though not always formally, they participate in at least one diocesan activity. Other priests, also approximately ten, young and less young, who also belong to a social niche, turn out to be relatively central most of all in matters of conviviality and personal support. Some of these priests are reputed to be "serious" or "wise", *i.e.* known to be good listeners and well-informed about the diocese. Most declare few projects and have no diocesan responsibility. Local stability and nearing retirement are two factors that allow us to detect priests whose status remains local. Parish priests in the large parishes present other characteristics: the large number of projects they declare (their parish being sufficiently well off for them to do so) does not encourage many interactions with their fellow-priests. They are busy either building a local status or one outside the diocese.

The relational structure and the interdependencies revealed in Fig. 10.1 shows why the diversity of religious orientations does not end in open conflict. It is the result of two relational strategies typical of collegial organizations: creating/looking for social niches, and peer competition for status. However, the more collegial the exchange system among priests, the more accessing a position such as, for

instance, the bishop's vicar, demands being able to play the game of unity, and finding and coopting priests who want to accept positions of responsibility to promote their own beliefs. In turn, the bishop counts on status competition to identify the leaders he will co-opt and with whom he will negotiate an agreement on the most consensual positions and practices possible. Thanks to a few popular but weak linchpins, he manages to exercise control on the various coopted young spokesmen of controversial orientations. Thus the analysis of these interactions show which 'orientation' was embattled with another, but not that anyone clearly won. There was no clear winner out amongst these *tendances* at that time. A form of complex balance of Catholic orientations emerges that is able to present a collegial compromise based, firstly, on cooptation and neutralization of threatening centrifugal forces, and secondly on window-dressing an apparent consensus.

Top-Down Collegiality: The Complex Bureaucratic Management of the Diversity of Catholic Orientations

In short, this division of religious work in different orientations with an underlying complex relational infrastructure (social niches and forms of status) articulates the bishop and the exchange system in a way that creates a specific and local balance between bureaucracy and collegiality thanks to the distribution of diocesan mandates and co-optation in the episcopal committees. In the networks analysed in this diocese, the status and centrality of several priests from the unthreatening orientation, called 'catholic action in independent milieux', is mainly built on their popularity among the 'unaligned', their proximity to the bishop, their very general commitment to the construction of consensus and respect of collective responsibility in the '*sacerdoce presbytéral*'. In other words, they are the pivots/linchpins articulating the system of niches and the core-periphery structure. This system creates just enough cohesion between different orientations, between older and younger generations of priests, who accept the social discipline and compromise personified by the structural linchpins.

If bottom-up collegiality depends on a form of specialization in various domains – in conceiving of diverse and often opposed religious orientations for instance – which makes it easier to grasp the diversity of Catholic identities (Donégani 1993, 2000), then the risk that a church might explode is real (Willaime 1986, 1992). The story of the Catholic Church is punctuated by tensions with groups, movements or associations capable of provoking serious schisms. In order to manage diversity and preserve unity, the Church proceeded to establish an administrative and cultural bureaucracy by creating a chain of command that stands for unity even if it is only a front, and by standardizing symbols easy to communicate and identify. However, the contemporary context of the Catholic Church in France demands that priorities be redefined and new norms for religious activity negotiated. The bishop has the authority to make such decisions but there remains doubt as to their efficiency, both internally (their being obeyed) and with regard to the global

society where democratic values prevail. In general, relations between the Church and French society seem uncertain and diminish the effectiveness of an organization and decision-making processes which are merely bureaucratic. Henceforth, the decision-making process is partly determined by the hierarchy's acceptance of relative autonomy for the rank and file and the search for consensus with the support of religious expertise. Organizing diocesan synods is the perfect example of the coexistence between the monocratic leader of a diocesan administration on one hand, and, on the other, the lower echelons coordinated in top down collegial fashion, whose largest possible participation in decision-making is only periodically sought.

Thus, the unity of the Catholic Church largely depends on the bishop's work and the complex balance of powers that he builds. The complexity of a pastoral activity divided into different religious orientations makes direct control by a monocratic authority difficult. The diocesan services contribute to elaborating the norms that govern pastoral activity and participate in the initial training and continuing education of religious actors. Their participation in defining the rules for religious activity can create conflict with the priests, who can criticize the bishop for treading on their toes – *e.g.* when it comes to catechism, deciding on the curriculum or the age for first communion. Relations between diocesan services and priests can be compared to the relationship between administration and professionals. The diversity and need for coordination translate into the fact that organizing diocesan responsibilities is primarily entrusted to priests. A bishop is supposed to represent the unity of the diocese even if his own convictions cause him to give one component of the diocese precedence over another. Nevertheless, it may be in his best interest to keep the show on the road and save his reputation intact by conferring diocesan responsibilities on the various representatives of religious orientations equitably. In so doing, he is promoting a hard-line, typically "Catholic" strategy that aims to integrate a maximum of diversity and obtaining in exchange, from the integrated elements, the toning down of the expression of their own convictions. On the other hand, a strategy of that sort – which we observed in this diocese – reinforces the interdependence between the bishop and the priests' exchange system, so that decision-making is necessarily collective, implying that the other religious actors – permanent deacons or lay people – also be included, in practice if not in theory.

In organizational terms, this is why it is crucial to identify the members who adopt one or several inconsistent forms of endogenous status, i.e. the linchpins. The bishop's co-optation of the most central colleagues in matters of collaboration, advice and personal support, puts the most visible representatives of the various religious orientations in a 'situation'. This means that collegiality is being transformed into a tool for management with help from structurally specific individuals who are able to manage the 'situation' created at the top, i.e. the structural linchpins. Formally, a bishop's action at the head of the diocese depends on his direct collaboration with three types of actors: the members of the Episcopal council – among whom figure the Grand Vicar and the district Episcopal vicars – the diocesan services and the diocesan councils. The latter are usually purely consultative, though voting procedures are applied *e.g.* during sessions of the Presbyteral council. They

allow every type of actor – priests, deacons, monks and nuns, lay people – to participate to a greater or lesser extent in the bishop's decision-making.

The Episcopal council is where decisions are made and important diocesan orientations decided upon. The council includes Episcopal vicars who play an important role for they advise the bishop on parish appointments and the distribution of diocesan mandates. Theoretically, they oversee and evaluate priests' work. At the time of our research the diocese was composed of four pastoral zones whose borders had been traced in the 1970s. Each at that time was homogeneous from a social and professional point of view: one was traditionally bourgeois, one working-class, one a new town and one a rural area. Each pastoral zone was headed by an Episcopal vicar appointed by the bishop to organize the assignment of priests in the area and set up zone days during which most of the persons officially invested in pastoral activity met: priests, permanent deacons, lay members of the pastoral team or the chaplaincy. Those special days were built around themes such as the relationship to politics or to Judaism, or were opportunities for members of the pastoral team to exchange and compare their experiences. Each zone was composed of *doyennés* (deaneries, 16 in all), pastoral sections or groups of parishes. Every 3 years, each *doyenné* elected a dean from its ranks, theoretically to watch over his colleagues but in fact to be another relay for the bishop. This allowed the latter to summon the deans to yearly meetings. Pastoral sectors are what remains of the teamwork pastoral actors aimed to put into practice during the 1970s. Today they are the starting point for creating groups of parishes. At the time of our survey, the diocese was made up of 45 groups of parishes and 53 parishes.

A hierarchal system of committees – the Episcopal, presbyteral and pastoral diocesan councils in particular – is thus created top-down to allow the bishop to direct the diocese from above while translating into more general terms the priests' specialized, locally collegial approaches. The distribution of diocesan responsibilities is based partly on criteria connected to the priest's informal status: decision-making in the diocese and in the parishes is imbued with a modern rationalization that depends on profane competences and religious expertise (diplomas, experience). The creation and multiplication of diocesan services, supposed to be in the avant-garde of a religious domain composed of specialists (catechism, training, social work, etc.), is an example of how the demand for rationalization increases. Secondly, when one considers the way Episcopal zone vicars and deans are appointed, clearly the informal recognition of priests by their peers plays an important role, for the bishop nominates the dean or Episcopal vicar at the end of a consultative vote.

Top-down collegiality considered from that angle is precisely the way Max Weber defined it. It is adjustable and suits diocesan situations that involve bishop, linchpins, priests and lay people; for it does not mean that the hierarchy has eased its pressure on the lower ranks. For instance, at the time of our study, the hierarchy had installed a local "pastoral team", a collective managerial organ to replace the parish priest's individual leadership. It was comprised of the parish priest, often the vicars, and three to five lay members generally elected by the parish. The lay members are however designated by the bishop by way of an official letter of appointment

and "installed" for a 3-year period by the zone's Episcopal vicar. That nomination procedure fuels the priests' fear that they will lose their traditional privileges and see a hierarchy parallel to theirs develop. Bottom-up collegiality among priests may then resemble a defense mechanism directed against top-down collegiality. They both play ball with the bishop (to publicize and share more widely their own private views about the nature of their religious and institutional commitments) and try to influence the decisions of the monocratic leader, thus bolstering their identity compared with lay people.

Micro-political, Morphogenetic Co-Constitution of Bottom-Up and Top-Down Collegiality

This case goes beyond just showing how the Catholic church's hierarchy finds a balance between its own goals and the goals pursued by priests working in local parishes, thereby revisiting the theory of institutionalization by co-optation. Making some headway on the problem of how two organizational forms – collegiality and bureaucracy – are interrelated, the duality of collegiality can be used to look at how the two definitons of collegiality are combined. Collegiality as a particular form of organization can be shown to be really a bottom-up type of collegiality, based on carrying out uncertain, non-routine tasks collectively among peers. In the case under study, it takes the form of conceiving and promoting religious orientations (conveying different conceptions of priestly professionalism), through an informal division of labour between orientations that are difficult to arrange in any hierarchical order among the organization's priorities. Such an informal division of labour creates interdependencies and depends on a specific social discipline that helps members keep up their active collaboration and commitment as well as certain forms of consensus. The priests' exchange system indicates and measures that social discipline and also reveals the fact that creating consensus is facilitated by forming a collegial oligarchy, in our case a limited number of priestly "spokesmen" for religious orientations and the linchpins who are also capable of playing the role of intermediaries with the master.

Our example of one articulation between bureaucracy and collegiality leaves open the question of whether institutional changes ahead will indeed be morphogenetic. Bottom-up collegiality is different from the one constructed by a hierarchy in an already bureaucratic context, *i.e.* collegiality as a tool for management, which we call top-down collegiality. In the best of cases, the latter identifies the social niches of bottom-up collegiality as "collegial pockets" that emerge in the organization. In top-down collegiality, the members of the committees assisting the official leader are chosen with an eye to gaining support for policies that can be decided autocratically as well as through collective deliberation. From the perspective of bureaucratic management, bottom-up collegiality is often an insignificant "micro-collegiality" responsible for problems of oppositional solidarity and integration that "macro-collegiality" can solve. In all more or less bureaucratic organizations calling upon expertise, *i.e*. in a large proportion of contemporary organizations, both forms of collegiality – bottom-up and top-down – coexist in that way.

But bureaucracy and collegiality do more than coexist in a context combining an endogenous system of niches and statuses on one side, and an absolute master, a hierarchical structure and a parallel administration on the other. They actually challenge each other in a potentially destructive way and can be said to drive each other's evolution in a potentially morphogenetic sense. If the structure of the network changes but the diocese survives, then the diocese as a system is morphogenetic. Each kind of collegiality thus represents a morphogenetic impulse pushing for change and creating variety on "the other side". The system can be morphogenetic because of the tensions between the groups and the fragile equilibrium that is unlikely to last without renegotiations. A bishop can try to ignore the problems of integration encountered in his diocese; the priests themselves may not feel obliged to welcome the different tendencies and conceptions of professionalism present; linchpins may not emerge. Everything depends on the social strength of the exchange system, perhaps on the priests' social origins (Bourdieu and Saint Martin de 1982), but also on the size, composition and structure of their network as a determinant of the social processes that together constitute their social discipline (Lazega 2012): a small number of isolated priests carry much less weight than a large number of priests united by their interdependencies and by certain forms of oppositional solidarity.

The portfolio of strategies available for coordinating bottom-up and top-down collegiality is fairly large. The first step is cooptation by choosing members of social niches to sit on executive councils. According to the level of rationalization implemented, the transformation of collegiality into a means of management may either constantly refine the relationship between the two types of collegiality, or forgo bottom-up collegiality, keeping only the rhetoric, thus paralyzing cooperation between experts/peers. The problem posed by the ubiquity of contemporary "bureau-collegiality" and related organizational morphogenesis concerns an increasing number of institutions: hospitals, universities, research institutes, political groups, etc. It is the renewed expression of an older and more profound question about the latitude and freedom of expertise and about professionals when they organize their work notwithstanding the many restrictions – economic or political – confronting them. But it is also a renewed expression of the issue of the relationship between the commons and the wider society. Indeed this example can be used as an introduction to the issue of the new commons as a potentially new and dual morphogenetic reality: that of the transformation of social discipline recognized as legitimate into violent and exogenous forms of collective responsibility.

Big Data and Digital Parametrization of Collective Responsibility in the New Commons

This case in point represents just one possible articulation between bureaucracy and collegiality, but there are many such combinations in a bureaucratized organizational society in which the commons emerge from attempts by the people to take control of the ways in which they want collectively to share common resources, locally

and beyond. In many ways, the struggles between bureaucracy and collegiality that are described here are precisely the struggles to shape the institutionalization of the new commons. The organizational conditions under which the new commons can use social capital in collective responses to the bleak prospects of humanity and develop credible institutions that will resist the most destructive changes introduced by modernity, is a real political question. It is important to consider organized settings as sets of social mechanisms providing structural solutions to collective action problems. All the main social phenomena –such as solidarity and exclusions, social control and conflict resolution, learning and socialization, regulation and institutionalization – have a relational dimension and depend on relational infrastructures, established or emergent. Social capital is composed of social processes and relational infrastructure, and it is a form of social discipline that helps manage collective government of resources defined as commons.

A specialized, in this case ecclesiastic, institution cannot be a model for a democratic society (Where are, for example, women? Lay participants? Why should the meeting of bottom-up and top-down forces depend on the "generosity" of the absolute master willing to "share" some of his power? Etc.). In the context of the current transition, if democracy is itself threatened and paralyzed by its inability to deal with problems as horrendous as in the list at the start of this chapter, the morphogenetic dynamics illustrated by the case in point could be politically and morally much more inspiring than a morphostatic scenario in which society goes down a fascist path of collegiality among predatory elites abusing their powers without any checks and balances; sitting atop a police/military bureaucracy controlling civil society and uniform mass markets with quotas; and undermining any attempt to challenge their order by parametrizing the digital instruments on which local commons/communities count for self organization –thereby remote-controlling the many individually, by invading their privacy systematically; monitoring and using the risks associated with their health in order to threaten them; building relational infrastructures that promote stable forms of collective responsibility that neutralize institutional entrepreneurship or any changes sought out by potentially threatening bottom-up forces. Democracy must win, but there is also a lesson in an organizational morphogenesis forcing hierarchical, superimposed levels of oligarchs to accept changes coming from below.

The analysis of the two forms of collegiality provides leads for theorizing the social mechanisms that will institutionalize the commons, their collective intelligence and social innovation. Institutionalization of the commons cannot be construed as the top-down product of plouto-technocratic bureaucracies going down the military path. The latter are not able to create such new sharing institutions by *fiat*. It is reasonable to anticipate that they will try to coopt, control and "parametrize" them once they have emerged from much more bottom-up processes. In a ruthless capitalist society such a top-down parametrization will be for social control, imposition of vioent forms of collective responsibility, extraction of profits, and taxation. Given the current developments in technology, the process of top-down bureaucratization of the future new commons means their parametrization is likely to be their digitalization. Parametrization will be digital in the sense that it will

rest on people's use of platforms, in particular network profiles and groups created on this platform and used by the people themselves to practice their daily social accounting of exchanges, management of meetings and coordination.

The bottom-up challenges to the legitimacy of top-down collective responsibility imposed by this bureaucratic parametrization to shape the institutionalization of the new commons will take the form of morphogenetic struggles to control this digitalization. Since there may not be any optimal stabilization of this struggle, society may also become a morphognenic system with an ongoing creation of new models. Digital parametrization of the new commons is part of contemporary morphogenetic institutional changes. This parametrization started long ago with widespread and gamified intrusiveness of platforms providing network profiles into individual privacy,[7] as well as the capacity offered to citizens to all become creators of online collectives. This digitalization may also undermine bottom-up institutional entrepreneurship. Indeed, in many online network services provided globally, individuals today can look at their list of contacts but not at the structure of their own network profile, even less at the profiles of their friends, and cannot reconstitute "communities" and organized social movements that are created by the hypergraph and concatenation of these profiles. They lack the capacity to zoom in and out of social networks that are, at any one point in time, the carriers of organized collegial action. Only ownership and control of the platform provide that capacity today, without any real checks on this new power.

Social digitalization as bureaucratic control of future new collegial commons is carried out as parametrization of the organization of collegial local communities and sharing networks. Such new commons may not be purely local but locality matters, even as geolocal grounding for these platforms. It makes it easier for ordinary citizens to resist when bureaucrats, party leaders, creditors, inspectors, etc. show up. The generic commons are for the neighbours' association, people sharing the same actual physical land resources. Locality creates a centre of gravity for them and for the sharing of resources or space that helps with their sustainability.[8] This social digitalization is based on monitoring, accounting for and making sense of exchanges, but also on shaping relational infrastructures (providing such actors with more centrality, such niches with more resources).

The morphogenetic process of institutionalization of new kinds of commons will use digital platforms and as such it may be a silent, invisible process of parametrization of these commons with bureaucratic algorithms as much as (if not much

[7]For an example of how bureaucratization of the future new commons could take place, recall 'social digitalization' as an indicator and substantive part of contemporary social morphogenesis, and see the use of devices such as body captors and network profiles and their influence on institution building (Lazega, Lazega 2015a, in Archer (ed.) *Generative Mechanisms Transforming the Social Order*).

[8]A purely online group is an effective way to organize for groups that are not limited / organized by a common locality, as when young innovators meet up to think up new codes in many areas (even in biology), work on projects together and start a business. These are not the same as commons with strong locality.

more than) an open political process of democratic (representative or participative) rulemaking. Social digitalization can be a new way of subjecting, homogenizing and taxing the diverse commons unobtrusively. As in the duality of collegiality, it may increase the rate of creation of new commons, but also end up subordinating them to bureaucratic control. The tools for creating the commons could also be the sources for their streamlining. Social digitalization will increase the rythm of creation of commons that existed before the emergence of these platforms. Research needs to flesh out the set of choices that these digital platforms make for citizens when they use them to build their new commons –i.e. choices that they are not aware of and that prestructure the unexpected ways in which these commons will be used to enforce collective responsibility.

If the meeting between bureaucracy and collegiality is now shaped by social digitalization bureaucratizing the commons in an organizational and morphogenetic process, platforms will organize civil society by parametrizing collective responsibility, within or without the framework of the/civil law. The social order that platforms thus develop will rest in part on online virtual social networks of interactions and organize the live offline relations that coordinate/emerge through these platforms. Since it creates the online context for live offline relations and exchanges, the multilevel architecture and the ownership and control of the platform itself deserve close sociological inquiry. This is even highly compatible with mass bureaucratized markets plus the military pathway to the bleak prospects outlined above. Such a digital structure can take over at the macro level and manage millions of collegial pockets that will try to protect themselves from both the environmental crunch and the violence of the military bureaucracy.

Creating institutions for the new local commons will be a dynamic multilevel process (Lazega 2013, 2014b) mobilizing networks, relational infrastructures, social processes and many other ingredients characterizing collegiality, including its vicious cycles (of patronage, clientelism and corruption). But the emergence of this institution will be parametrized by bureaucracy just as the bishop sets limits and conditions to his priests' participation and cooptation. It sheds light on the widening 'democratic deficit' that characterizes modern societies. This institutionalization raises the more general issue of the relationship between the democratic process and lobbying in pluto-technocratic bureaucracies. Tracing this regulatory process leads back to the determinants and proliferation of 'anormative regulation' (Archer 2016 volume; Al-Amoudi 2014; Al-Amoudi and Latsis 2014).

Behind any commons, there are communities mixing formal and informal rules, contractual and non market relationships (Coriat 2015) thanks to the relational dimension of social processes. In a world in which profit extraction and capital accumulation are violent, bureaucratization of the local commons can be seen as both a way to prevent local communities from closing off in oppositional solidarities, privatizing their resources in their collegial pockets; and a way to spread new digital and bureaucratic controls that will monitor, manage, tax and sanction, using collective responsibility, in potentially predatory ways these local communities. If elites with private armies prefer their current closure and the military pathway, then mechanisms must be put in place to challenge them and

force them to equate survival and the interests of the many, not only the collegial and oligarchic few. Despots, even enlightened ones who are helped by big data platforms invading people's privacy, cannot achieve on their own the protection of a heritage that can be transmitted and without which the next generations will not have a decent life. Hopefully, democracy can be saved by new New Deals and new constitutions. It can be trumped by plutocracy and captured institutions. It can be destroyed by fascism; but it can be also weakened by parametrization of the new digitalized commons, i.e. transformed into an ersatz of democracy, using collegiality as a tool for management, just like the Catholic church, but with likely more brutal and forced forms of collective responsibility.

If morphogenetic processes only may be able to bring about the changes that are needed for collective survival, then mechanisms should be put in place that, based on better understanding of new forms of co-constitution of bureaucracy and collegiality, challenge closed elites and force them to equate survival and the interests of the many, not only the collegial and oligarchic few. By using for example dynamics of multilevel networks to identify forms of virtuous and vicious organizational morphogenesis, sociologists may increase their chances of making their discipline relevant again for institutional change and innovation. Indeed knowledge of organizational morphogenesis may help actors define the collegial social discipline that they find legitimate for their commons so as not to exhaust the social capital that produces an alternative to the bureaucratic and military path, and eventually understand how to create a protected heritage to transfer to future generations. A neostructural approach is a useful part of the intellectual adventure of contemporary social sciences if it helps identify in morphogenetic mechanisms what must change in the transition for the earth to be livable by future generations.

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