Two definitions of collegiality and their inter-relation: The case of a Roman Catholic diocese

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Abstract

Against the backdrop of the conflict observed between managers and professionals, two definitions of collegiality emerge: on one hand, a specific organizational form (bottom up) and, on the other, a procedure of bureaucratic management (top down). A study of networks of priests in a Roman Catholic diocese in France is used to explore how those two definitions are related. Questions are raised as to the effects of a too narrow organizational rationalization that uses collegiality only as a top down, bureaucratic, managerial procedure. This always entails the risk of making the work done by experts sterile because it overlooks the first type of collegiality, which is based on the nature of non-routine tasks that members perform together thanks to an endogenous organizational structure of a bottom up type.

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1. The background to the conflict between managers and professionals

In the 1960s, Anglo-Saxon sociological literature regarded the professions as a specific phenomenon bringing together specialists whose interactions had to be interpreted independently from any profit-making or economic consideration. Organizations were viewed as bureaucracies, as tools in the division and coordination of labor thanks to a rational-legal hierarchy implying a routine respect of the rules. Profession and bureaucracy were thought to be incompatible and
antithetical, both from the standpoint of the principles that structure the organization of work and from the point of view of motivation and obedience.

Including professionals in bureaucratic contexts was therefore considered a sociological problem in and of itself. The way professionals fit into such organizations, where they are called upon to wield authority with regard to employers or managers who themselves control considerable resources—employment, promotions, income, instruments, etc.—has been widely explored. One of the factors at stake in a large bureaucracy is the degree of autonomy granted to—or negotiated by—professionals and how their performance is assessed. As a general rule, experts enjoy greater autonomy than employees whose specialization is due to the division of labor in the organization (Freidson, 1986). Much has been written about that autonomy—and about the expert knowledge upon which it rests (Rueschemeyer, 1983)—regarding scientists (Kornhauser, 1962 and Miller, 1967), physicians (Bucher and Stelling, 1969; Engel, 1970 and Freidson, 1975) and lawyers (Smigel, 1969) among others. All these professionals share a certain number of features: competence, knowledge, expertise; a sense of belonging to a professional community; a training period that stressed autonomy, individual internalized standards of performance and accountability (Rothman, 1979). Because of those features, which they bring with them to the job, they tend to enter into a conflict with the emphasis the organization places on hierarchy, coordination and standardized procedures (Benson, 1973 and Hall, 1968). The autonomy enjoyed by the professions is all the greater in an organization that has several objectives or whose objectives are somewhat ambiguous (Lortie, 1969).

W. Richard Scott (1965) depicted the conflict in the following manner: professionals carry out a task from beginning to end; they work alone, count on their expertise, acquired outside the organization over the course of lengthy training during which they were also socialized (making any form of social control superfluous); they are first and foremost loyal to their profession and to their peers; their activity is the result of what, to the best of their knowledge, seems the best solution to any given problem; and as practitioners, they have attained a certain level and are not looking to improve their position in the organization. In contrast, bureaucrats accomplish a limited number of partial tasks that must be coordinated with those of other employees; their training is short, patchy and for the main part on-the-job; they are overseen by a supervisor and penalized if they do not observe the rules; their loyalties and careers are inseparable from the organization and the chain of command.

At this point, the existing literature postulates that the two roles are incompatible and conflictive, essentially because professionals are allergic to bureaucratic rules, supervision and hierarchical control, but also because they do not like the idea of being loyal to a firm. Much attention has been devoted to the dilemmas faced either by professionals in organizations—the adjusting and fine-tuning bureaucratic strictures demand—or by managers—how to structure an organization putting professional competence to good use but avoiding conflict (Etzioni, 1969). In this line, Eugene Litwak (1961) suggested “models of bureaucracy which permit conflict”.

Criticism leveled at the functionalist conceptions of organizations and of the professions questioned the thesis of insoluble conflict anew. Such criticism—notably expressed by Benson (1973) and Davies (1983)—was founded on data that shows, on one hand, that bureaucratization and professionalizing in an organization go hand in hand in ways that are complementary rather than alternative; and on the other, that adjustments can succeed despite supposed incompatibilities; and

1 The English term “professional” earmarked this debate from the start and was also used in the French version of this article.
finally, that some individuals manage to fill, apparently with ease and satisfaction, roles which are both professional and bureaucratic (Larson, 1977).

Following this reassessment, we return to the debate surrounding the “conflict” and look more closely at the ways it has been socially constructed. We show that the conflict is not primarily between manager and professional but, in the first place, between two modes of organization, one collegial, the other bureaucratic—the latter nevertheless also offering a second definition of collegiality that we call “bureau-collegiality” or “top down collegiality”. This second definition aims to neutralize the micro-political conflicts stemming from the problematic relationship between the two forms of organization. We therefore propose to reframe the conflict between manager and professional as being the question of the difference and articulation between two forms of collegiality. We will be illustrating our idea through an organizational and structural analysis of a Roman Catholic diocese in France.

2. Collegiality: a specific form of organization or a tool for bureaucratic management?

Organizations that coordinate the activities of experts and professionals called upon to make decisions in situations of uncertainty and who spend much of their time accomplishing non-routine tasks, still represent a basic problem in the sociology of organizations today. Max Weber’s most systematic writings on the issue centered on collegiality and are to be found in Book III on political sociology in Economy and Society. Those pages reflect his theory that rationalization and bureaucratization increase in modern societies, and he presents collegiality as one tool among others for bureaucratic management. The process consists in setting experts to work together in committees, requiring them to come to an agreement. The prince or head of a bureaucratic organization applies that method to avoid depending on a single expert or on experts in general—who they fear—and to verify their loyalty and competence. At the same time, collegiality can also become a mitigating force in the face of a potentially arbitrary, corrupt, or autocratic, “monocratic” power.

Criticizing the sociological literature of the 1960s on the relationship between professionals and administrators in bureaucratic organizations opened the door to a part revision of that instrumental conception of collegiality. Original neo-Weberian theses have recently proposed reversing the point of view: they list an ensemble of formal characteristics that set a collegial and “polycratic” form of organization apart from the bureaucratic and monocratic form (Waters, 1989). Such organizations use and implement theoretical knowledge. Their members are considered professionals and their careers divided into at least two parts—apprenticeship and practice—practice being the result of a form of tenure. Though performance-minded, the organizations encounter difficulties when obliged to compare specialists’ performance, thus resolving to place them formally on an equal footing. The organizations exert formal self-control and consequently are self-regulating. They adopt their own supervisory methods for quality control—colleagues exchanging opinions, for example. They create at least one forum—that may turn into a more or less complex and hierarchical system of committees—where decision-making is collective, a guarantee of quality and efficiency when much knowledge is required.

2 Philip Strong and Robert Dingwall interpret the difference between two types of organization as being the result of the tension described by Everett Hugues, between occupational licenses and organizational charters. The terms charter and license are used to describe the authorizations to which participants refer in order to coordinate their action and make it legitimate. There is always tension between the two instances to the extent that professionals’ overt claims for autonomy interfere with the development of a chain of responsibilities ranging from the bottom to the top of the hierarchy (Strong and Dingwall, 1983).

3 A theoretical stance that, despite Robert Michels’ insistence, Max Weber refused to look into (Scaff, 1981).
The neo-Weberian approach also produced a theory of collective action among peers that accounts for the social discipline and collective responsibility observed in those entities (Lazega, 2000, 2001, 2003a, b), made compulsory by the fact that partners who are actual or potential rivals often have no choice except to cooperate. This sort of social discipline depends in particular on the existence of personal relations and multipurpose social exchanges among sub-groups, relations which for a long time in the standard bureaucratic model were considered “particularistic” obstacles for collective action (Perrow, 1986). In an ideal-typical collegial organization, those relations become on the contrary the source of a social discipline that helps members cooperate, i.e. exchange, exert pressure on, monitor and sanction each other reciprocally, select their leaders or have them take turns as managers, or yet again negotiate precarious values for self-regulation (Selznick, 1957).

The sociology of organizations has thus produced at least two approaches, one according to Weber’s theory, whereby collegiality is defined as a means of bureaucratic management; the other according to neo-Weberian theory, where it is defined as an organizational form *per se*. Therefore, how the two approaches can coexist is a question that arises both in theory and in practice. The Weberian point of view is destined to evolve. In large bureaucracies, aside from the often collegial-like behavior of many top executives (Baylis, 1989 and Devigne, 2004), the accent placed on cooperation between experts, the elimination of several hierarchical levels, or the generalization of decentralization and project management have given rise to new working contexts which promote what a bureaucrat might call “collegial pockets” characterized by the social mechanisms of survival and cooperation among rival peers. The neo-Weberian point of view is also destined to evolve: it recognizes that the formal and social features of a collegial organization are precisely ideal-typical, like those of classical bureaucracies. Since routine and non-routine tasks are, in contemporary organizations and institutions, most often inextricably linked (Lazega, 1993, 2005), bureaucracy and collegiality coexist in all modern structures of decision-making. The question is therefore whether the conflict between manager and professional must not be seen against the backdrop of the *relationship* between those two definitions of collegiality. In this article, we propose to explore how the two definitions relate. We show that the relationship is necessarily conflictive, i.e. the result of a struggle between the top and bottom levels of an organization which brings together interdependent experts and is dependent on their constrained cooperation.

3. The case of a Roman Catholic diocese

We will demonstrate our idea by carrying out an organizational and neo-structural analysis of one of the largest Catholic dioceses in France. A diocese—which in France corresponds to a *département*—is a complex organization (Granfield, 1988) with fuzzy borders due to the great number of associations, movements and groups that gravitate around it. It is composed of bureaucratically organized local communities complete with administrators, committees and a multitude of services all concentrated in one spot, the diocese. It is headed by a bishop nominated by the bishops of the given province and appointed by the Pope, bishop of Rome. We think that it is possible to illustrate the conflict between managers and professionals by the way the Roman Catholic Church, one of the most ancient and complex organizations in the Western world, functions; it should be added that the principle of collegiality among priests has no theological foundation.

It is no longer possible to describe a clerical organization of this type before it became a bureaucracy using Malcolm Waters’ formal criteria. We will therefore examine how, in this diocese, collegiality as a form of organization was discernible in a collegial form of social discipline (Lazega, 2001) both in the priests’ various pastoral practices and in the organizational
bottom up pressures that they create for collective action. This becomes possible if part of the priest’s pastoral activity is understood as a form of expertise specialized in domains connected to various groups of believers (Gannon, 1971). We will then proceed like archaeologists, looking for the markers of collegiality in an emerging structure (already partly redefined by the hierarchy) by analyzing their social networks. Analyzing the many areas of interdependencies and social exchange in a population of priests belonging to the same diocese reveals how part of the system of interrelations unveiled was organized according to a division of labor implying religious “offers”, among which it is difficult to establish any particular order and where the role of the Catholic chain of command is also somewhat wobbly. The social organization of the diocese, examined here exclusively from the priests’ point of view, displays characteristics of a collegial organization, i.e. a specific organizational form. The fact that priests dedicated to different offers interrelate makes it possible to build a consensus. All these elements prove that a bottom up type of collegiality among priests exists.

But the Roman Catholic Church is also a bureaucracy in which the bishop, as master of his diocese, detains most of the formal power; his authority is potentially monocratic. Formally speaking, his power is nevertheless curbed from above, since the Bishop of Rome and the Roman Curia have the capacity to intervene should a disagreement arise (Gellard, 1977 and Schilling, 2002); as well as—since Vatican II—from below through the existence of councils, particularly with respect to finances (Diocesan Council for economic affairs). It is the bishop’s duty to appoint at least one vicar general to assist him in managing the diocese. He is relatively free to organize the diocese as he sees fit, concerning, for instance, the meetings of the Episcopal Council, equivalent of a “high command” in the diocese. We shall be looking at the system of committees set up by the bishop in top down fashion to cope with the pressures emanating from below that do not leave him much choice as to who should sit on those committees if he does not want his diocese to explode.

Let us start by describing priests’ work, its routine and non-routine sides, the group of priests observed, and the variety of Catholic offers they invent in order to adapt to their different clienteles, and the problems of identity and unity such diversity stirs up within the Church4. Seen through the priests’ eyes, collegiality represents a way to coordinate their activities, permitting the religious offer they promised to create and represent to be built up, recognized and appreciated. We will next see how, since Vatican II, the bureaucratic organization of the Catholic Church5 has reintroduced elements of collegiality—such as the system of councils that frame the bishop’s decision-making processes within the diocese or the creation of national Episcopal conferences. We shall describe how the Catholic hierarchy conceives of collegiality, institutionalizing and using it à la Weber, as a tool for management.

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4 The “church” type of religious organization is characterized by a “compromise” (Ernst Troeltsch presented by Jean Séguy, 1980) between religious message and global society. This signifies that religious activity combines behavior patterns and meanings emanating from the global society with behavior and meaning specific to the religious domain. Again according to E. Troeltsch, a church accepts many forms of membership. Historically, such diversity was a permanent feature in the Catholic Church. It is likely that diversity in Catholicism was long reserved for the Catholic elite and represented by religious orders and other schools of thought (Desportes, 1988). Sociologically, that meant changing over from typologies of Catholic worshipers defined by their fervor to typologies illustrating the plurality of Catholic identities ([Donégani, 1993] and [Piette, 1999]). It would seem that contemporary French Catholicism is characterized by the widespread plurality of Catholic identities, a plurality acknowledged by the institution (Donégani, 1993).

5 More precisely, the bureaucratization of the Roman Catholic church culminated with Vatican I in the second half of the 19th century.
Two sorts of empirical data were gathered between 1998 and 2001 (Wattebled, 2004). Semi-structured interviews were carried out with fifty priests working in the same diocese, and thirty lay members of the pastoral team, sitting on the pastoral council or working in a school or hospital chaplaincy. The interviews aimed at gaining more insight into the pastoral activities that priests and lay people accomplish together, obtaining information on priests’ interrelations and on the way those two aspects were formally organized in the diocese. They were also meant to pave the way to collecting a second type of empirical data. In face-to-face encounters, a questionnaire was submitted to 124 priests who had parish activity in the diocese; it yielded 104 usable questionnaires.\(^6\) The questionnaire was in three parts: questions on the priests’ individual characteristics (e.g. the training seminars they had attended or details on the missions they were entrusted with), completed by information taken from the diocese yearbook (year of birth, of ordination and appointment); questions on their interactions checked against the list — or name generator — of 124 priests working in the diocese (collaboration, advice, conviviality and personal support networks as presented in Appendix 1); questions on the priest’s pastoral activity (projects carried out in their parish); questions on how they feel about lay participation in pastoral activity, in the organization of the diocese and in the Catholic Church. It should be noted that the bishop did not wish to answer questions on relationships, which limits our ability to interpret certain of the results presented below.

4. Bottom up collegiality: back to the notion of a specific organizational form

A neo-Weberian approach begins with a description of actors’ work and the fact that they must collaborate in order to get a job done. From that standpoint, a collegial organization depends on a professional having the expertise required by the complex and uncertain activity at hand and on the existence of specialized domains. It is difficult to dispose these domains in any precise order and the professional logics that prevail are opposed to a bureaucracy based on standardization. On the contrary, these different characteristics foster an egalitarian conception among professionals and incite them to seek consensus.

We considered priests’ activity a form of expertise, i.e. pastoral activity rationalized in the sense of preserving an interaction between religious doctrine and social groups. It takes the shape of “rational and systematic discourse” in which religious and social realities and projects for religious as well as secular activities work together. The supposedly specific nature of that form of expertise is voiced by the priests who stress their familiarity with the realities in the field, compared to the bishop’s, and at the same time their capacity to distance themselves from the local community which facilitates their role as consensus-builders and arbitrators. It seemed to us that their sort of expertise, consisting in different “religious offers”, might be likened to a specialized domain. The various religious offers extant—activist, ritual and intellectual for the main part—illustrate the variety of a priest’s commitments and may explain the plurality of Catholic identities noted in and between parishes (Courcy, 1999).

A priest’s activity thus occupies a double register, each of which creates specific conflicts and interdependencies: a relatively standardized, generalist register and a specialized register. The latter is the result both of the personal convictions at the root of a specific commitment and of the fact that a church is split into several religious offers aimed at integrating different Catholic identities (Béraud, 2006; Charles, 1986; Gannon, 1979a, 1979b; Hervieu-Léger, 2003 and

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\(^6\) Thanks to the 2000–2001 diocesan directory, we were able to contact the 124 priests who had parish activity.
Villemin and Caillot, 2001). The specialized register offers the possibility of bottom up collegiality among priests. Individually, the diversity of persuasions and norms invested in their pastoral activity makes it difficult for them to accept a purely bureaucratic integration. Collectively, dividing pastoral activity into several different religious orientations makes it difficult for a monocratic authority to monopolize pastoral leadership. In this register, interdependencies between priests are more complex, more personal and collegial than in a generalist and bureaucratic register.

4.1. Priests’ pastoral activity: the collegial construction of religious offers

Generally speaking, the notion of “pastoral” work is vague and used for a multitude of activities, which have no obvious relation to each other (Béraud, 2006). Its collective and pragmatic side contrasts with the “spiritual” and theological. We defined it operationally as the activity that elaborates and implements all sorts of projects connected to a set of social and religious observations, aiming to religiously socialize and integrate all or part of a community—to uphold or reveal its religious specificity with respect to the behavior and significance of the non-religious environment. There is an intellectual dimension to that activity that turns it into what might be called “practical theology”.

In our study, we considered that one of the main areas of uncertainty that distinguishes a priest’s work involves the relationship between the Catholic Church and society all around: how to stop “exculturation” (Hervieu-Léger, 2003) or, conversely, how to establish a possibly positive interaction with that society. By choosing to study exclusively priests’ work and interactions one runs the obvious risk of treating the preconceived object—the Catholic priest himself—as if he were self-evident, whereas the growing participation of lay men and women in religious activity lays that open to doubt (Béraud, 2007 and Duriez, 2001). However, restricting our study to priests’ interrelations also has a contemporary explanation: priests, young ones in particular—whose identity claims are put forward time and again—are worried about maintaining and redefining their specific authority within the diocese. The involvement of laymen and women in religious activity makes that concern a crucial one.

In that respect, the most important resource in a diocese is the capacity to produce a “rational and systematic” discourse in which observations about the diocese and French society intersect with an ensemble of pastoral projects. Such discourse, rounded off by projects for secular as well as spiritual activities, aimed at believers as well as potential Catholics, is the raw material from which consensus is made. Discourses and projects rest on the identification of religious “needs”, thought to be difficult to guess in advance and perhaps different according to the social group. Such discourse produces various religious offers through which the diversity of Catholic identities noted among priests belonging to the same diocese is also expressed. Due to the complexity and variety of pastoral activities (Goudet, 1997 and Palard, 1985), it is difficult for a monocratic authority and a hierarchy to control the many registers of an individual priest’s activities, which also explains why it is impossible to prevent bottom up collegiality from forming.

The notion of “religious offer” is a metaphorical reference to the principle of an internal Catholic religious market, i.e. to the principle of an internal division between competing offers. Between

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7 An extension of this study would be—and its main shortcoming is not having been able to do so as yet—to observe the intricate exchanges between priests and lay people (e.g. men and women with diocesan responsibilities who received their assignment in a letter from the bishop): it would have allowed us to demonstrate the pertinence—or not—of an independent study of the exchanges between priests and to analyze interactions between them and lay people at the intermediate level according to the four types of exchanges defined here.
1998 and 2001, we identified three different offers—ritual, activist and intellectual—themselves stemming from two other offers which have become nearly extinct: Catholic action directed at the independent occupations and a specific offer directed at the working class. Those offers are part of distinct, historically ancient traditions updated at the local level and according to the contemporary situation of each individual diocese. The plurality of religious offers is not solely linked to religious logics. It also depends on the diversity of the groups of believers and their social evolution: for example the development of strongly under-privileged urban areas ("banlieues"), and the disappearance of traditional working-class neighborhoods, the transformation of middle class attitudes to politics, or the quest for social distinction among the well-off bourgeoisie.

Typically, a **ritual offer** reintroduces elements considered traditional into the religious activity of a parish (‘adoration’ especially). This links up with young people’s desire for religious leadership (e.g. the European scout movement), the demand for a Catholic identity in global society and implementing evangelical projects to recruit new worshippers. Among young priests, the three aspects combine with emphasizing the emotional dimension clearly apparent in their affective implication and resorting to charismatic groups. The offer conveys the vision of priest as holy leader looking to control the circulation of speech within a local community, particularly by making private confession a priority.

An **intellectual offer** is promoted by another group of priests. Since World War II, it has been part of a permanent undertaking to discredit the pious form of Catholic identification and promote a thoughtful and liberal adhesion to Catholicism through theological learning. In the confrontation with contemporary thought, it suggests that Christian faith should be expressed in intellectually acceptable terms. Contrary to what prevails in the “pastorale of independent occupations” (from which it seems to have stemmed), the political dimension and sense of solidarity have evaporated to the benefit of believers finding fulfillment in their family and professional lives. The offer is accompanied by a strong rationalization of pastoral activity (project-based approach disassociating the organizational and the spiritual, a more sophisticated division of labor). Claiming a specific position for the priest, though still not fully self-assured, is clearly pushed to the fore, at least his place as “intellectual leader and manager”, and arbitrator in the definition of parish priorities.

The **activist offer** underscores the role of local communities in working-class contexts. The starting point is the observation that the pastoral and the social are united, which must be the first consideration when giving priority to social intervention projects and inciting members of the congregation to participate in volunteer associations, religious or not. The idea is to claim Christian identity under that angle by being acknowledged as a social partner. It is also the starting point for a parallel activity aiming to enter into partnerships with local groups. A second perspective consists in provoking encounters with other religious groups, in particular Muslims, in order to clarify Christian identity. Putting the accent on lay responsibility, priests constantly seek to play down their own leadership and exploit the discrepancy between their own words and the traditional image of the priest.

Bottom up collegiality among priests is based on the diversity of their commitments and on their need to jointly transform them into locally credible religious offers and pastoral projects. The offers reflect the fractioning of a diocesan clergy thereby apt to respond to and socialize part of the several Catholic identities present. Bottom up collegiality organizes cooperation between interdependent priests building up their religious offers locally and wanting to remain in control of them. The top down creation of the Presbyteral council towards the end of the 1960s formally translated the hierarchy’s reaction to that observable fact. At stake in collegiality is also preservation of
privileges, i.e., in the present case, defending the specific authority of the priest with regard to lay people as much as with respect to the bishop.

Observing exchanges between priests is a good way to grasp the exact nature of bottom up collegial organization, for it brings to light the relations existing in the specific social discipline that they recognize as legitimate. In a collegial organization, where members must manage their functional interdependencies in a very personal manner, relational commitments follow at least two lines of social differentiation: one horizontal (identification, the construction or upkeep of the social niches that crystallize representations by giving them the strength of numbers), the other vertical (identification, the construction or upkeep of one or several forms—more or less heterogeneous, more or less consistent—of social status) (Lazega, 1999). To the extent that the main connections between priests have to do with maintaining their religious commitments and collectively promoting specifically Roman Catholic religious offers, analyzing the diocese as an organization should reveal sectors or social niches corresponding to sub-groups of priests exchanging extensively within the same niche and producing a pastoral offer together.

4.2. The relational structure of the system of social exchange among priests

Our representation of the priests’ exchange system illustrates the workings of bottom up collegiality quite clearly. Before going into the details, it is necessary to present the general characteristics of the links we observed and the nature of the social resources exchanged. The priests interviewed declared on the average 15.2 partners for collaboration, five partners for advice, between six and seven for conviviality and three for personal support, with considerable standard deviation (Wattebled, 2004). Relations for possible teamwork involved e.g. collaborating within the same parish or deanery, or with the bishop’s vicar to set up a parish team, or participating in a committee of the Presbyteral council or yet again meeting with the person in charge of sacred art to get a church altar ready. Counseling sometimes touched upon the same domains and involved sensitive issues (organizing the parish, celebrating the sacraments, resolving a conflict). In general, requests for advice were addressed to members of the hierarchy or to members of a group with whom there was a fellow feeling or to other colleagues in the same deanery. Conviviality hardly ever respected the pecking order, rather it looked for groups where there was affinity, or a deanery, or yet again it included outside relations. Personal support mainly combines hierarchical circles and affinity groups, as well as ties that extend beyond the established boundaries.

The system of social exchange between priests is pictured in Fig. 18. Within the context of a diocese and considering priests’ interactions, a social niche (in a system of niches) can be defined as a space for exchanging that combines different sorts of resources: sharing advice, conviviality and personal support. Local consensus develops and is maintained around a religious offer. Activities are evaluated and members given credit by their peers. A social niche is made up of teams of priests—whether informal or affiliated to a national or even international association

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8 The figure is the outcome of a statistical analysis aiming to compare simultaneously the “relational profiles” (in the four exchange networks) for each priest, by placing in the same class those that are similar according to measures of structural equivalence. Measuring the density of connections within a class makes it interpretable—or not—as a social niche in a system of niches, while seeking confirmation in our qualitative data (the existence of an association or informal team of priests). A social niche is analytically defined as a dense class of equivalence. Measuring the density of connections between classes allowed us to determine that classes are indeed related and the intensity of their relationship, and to interpret them as representing “positions” in the exchange system. From the point of view of strategic analysis, as we can see in the exchange system, a “position” is a sub-group of priests who play the same role in the division of labor.
Fig. 1. Representation of the exchange system of collaboration, advice, conviviality and personal support among priests. The figure simplifies the relationship between positions composed of priests approximately structurally equivalent in the four networks presented in Appendices 1 and 2. A greyed-in circle means the position is a “social niche”, an entity capable of collective action. We have chosen to consider a cluster as a social niche when the densities observed for the four links were above average in each network. Finally, a link between clusters is shown when the density observed was above average and according to the degree of reciprocity or the a-symmetry of links sent and received between clusters. Position 6, for example, shows above-average densities but was not considered a social niche for two reasons: firstly, the organization of links is not sufficiently cohesive; and secondly, the absence of teams of priests does not facilitate building a common identity and shared interests. Position 3 presents a similar configuration but with higher densities and includes a team of priests.

(for a training period, collaborating in a journal, or even organizing a seminar). One nevertheless observes a trend among young priests today to constitute only informal, “unaffiliated” groups; in doing so, they are mainly espousing generational and pastoral affinities.

The exchange system is composed of seven positions, each including a variable number of priests. Position 1 comprises seven priests. It brings together the bishop’s main advisers and two priests whose mandate in the diocese puts them in contact with a great number of colleagues. It includes a team of priests specialized in the field of Catholic action among the independent occupations. Position 2 has ten priests divided into two teams: one affiliated with a sacerdotal association and one an informal group of young priests. The first were elaborating a militant offer, had responsibilities in the diocese and served as advisers and main support for the younger group. In position 3, seven aged priests were committed to working class pastore and had in the past carried out diocesan missions in that domain. Position 4 is made up of eight priests: one group of parish priests connected to the intellectual offer and a team of young priests. Most of them have been given responsibilities in the diocese. Position 5 includes ten young priests, all part of the same informal team. They share the same determination to develop an offer with a ritual bent, and for the most part do not have any diocesan responsibilities. Position 6 is composed of eleven priests also implementing a ritual offer but who have not created a team, nor are they assigned any responsibility in the diocese. Position 7 is constituted of 33 priests, for the main
part aged 60, 70 or older; some are close to retirement. We have placed them in a category
called “community animators”, mixing priests who declare a routinely religious activity, oriented
according to parishioners’ wishes or their supervisors’ recommendations. It also includes a few
priests who develop particular religious offers, others with atypical activities such as spiritual
accompaniment or writing, and lastly, two priests who previously had assignments in the diocese.
To round up the seven positions there is a miscellaneous group called “residual”–a technical term
that does not signify “unimportant”–composed of sixteen priests whose profiles are unique, i.e.
do not correlate with that of others. Relationships between positions can be reconstituted based
on the density tables presented in Appendix 2.

In its middle section (positions 1 to 5), the exchange system is also organized in a system of
social niches where each niche can be connected to a religious offer. The system translates an
informal division of labor among priests. It should be stressed that position 1, associated with
Catholic action among independent occupations, can be considered hierarchical as well as social.
It is partly composed of a team of priests specialized in that field and chosen as a group by the
bishop to be his close advisers. Despite their position in the hierarchy, these priests were not only
mentioned often but also often mentioned their fellow priests, thus contributing to the circulation
of social resources.9

Three facets of the priests’ activities explain these interconnections and the interdependencies
between social niches. In the first place, redefining norms for religious activity and diocesan
priorities calls for building and maintaining consensus. To do so, the social niches must not function
separately and, as we mentioned above, priests must be able to extend their contacts beyond their
own social niche in order to be able to fill the role of intermediary or even spokesman in front
of the bishop. Secondly, the religious offers described above prove complementary, addressing
different populations of parishioners and in the end accounting for the diversity in the diocese. It
is difficult for a bishop to choose among the different offers and give precedence to one without
running the risk of cutting himself off from a large part of the faithful, among whom the priests
themselves. The fact that the priests fit into a system of social niches shows how complementary
they are indeed and keeps the voicing of radical convictions in check.10 Lastly, young priests
in particular share the desire to preserve the specific quality of their commitments, which, as a
collective concern, is likely to reinforce cohesion among priests beyond differences in pastoral
and theological sensitivities.

4.3. The endogenous emergence of heterogeneous forms of status among the priests

Developing cooperation among priests depends on that complex social discipline. But if each
social niche becomes meaningful only within the broader system of niches, that is due to social
comparisons and to the fact that social discipline is not exclusively “local” and based on accom-
plishing presbyteral tasks: representatives of a pastoral offer are in contact with colleagues who
share the same commitments in other parishes and other dioceses. A reinforced allegiance to
the bishop–a conception of the holy office shared by all the faithful and of the presbyteral office
shared by all the priests–is also part of the social discipline typical of bottom up collegiality among
priests. Within the diocese, the priest is no longer looking to establish a local status (an attitude

9 This was particularly evident in the case of one of the Episcopal vicars and in position 2, where priests are developing
an activist offer.
10 That restraint can be expressed by acknowledging the diversity of situations in the diocese and the solutions to apply.
Table 1
Correlations between forms of endogenous social status within the diocese: centrality scores of priests in each of the networks observed, number of projects declared and possession of a diocesan mandate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Collaboration</th>
<th>Advice</th>
<th>Conviviality</th>
<th>Personal support</th>
<th>Possessing a diocesan mandate</th>
<th>Number of projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration</td>
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<td>0.84</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Advice</td>
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<td>0.39</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of projects</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Centrality scores are calculated by adding the number of choices each individual received in each network (indegrees).

1. Possessing a diocesan mandate is coded as a binary variable: 1 when the priest has one, 0 when he has none.

Considered too “parochial”) especially since, as of the 1970s, he receives his assignments for a limited period of time only. “Diocesan priests” theoretically occupy an intermediate position between the diocese represented by the bishop and the parishes mainly run by laymen and women. That position incites them to try and create a diocesan status for themselves and aim for a formal title. Given the increasingly complex nature of pastoral activity and greater specialization of religious work, the large number of diocesan responsibilities—and small number of priests—compel them to compete for those titles.

It is not easy to analyze status competition among priests: the subject does not explicitly appear in discourse (where it is censored by the values of fraternity and consensus), nor is it explicitly mentioned in the exchanges they declared. We managed to analyze it by considering the priest in his position of middleman seeking to build a status for himself and having it acknowledged in the diocese and parishes. When analyzing priests’ speeches and exchanges, three levels appear to co-exist: the local level corresponds to the priest’s traditional desire to make a place for himself at the heart of the parish community. Being appointed to a different parish threatens that place for in a new community he must rebuild it from scratch. The diocesan level includes that dimension: it supposes recognition of and commitment to diocesan preoccupations and consequently means less local commitment, benefiting extra-parish exchanges with colleagues or lay people who have diocesan responsibilities in projects or councils. The extra-diocesan level concerns priests investing in activities or aiming for titles outside the diocese (the bishopry, a regional or national responsibility). Each time, accessing a higher level in this multilevel structure requires a more selective reorganization of contacts at the lower level.

When considering the relational data collected—more exactly the centrality scores obtained by the priests in each exchange network—it is possible to calculate correlations, determine the degree to which the scores converge and identify forms of status (consistent or not). Correlations are presented in Table 1. We completed the scores with two other variables that indicate a type of social status: possessing or not possessing a diocesan mandate, and the number of projects that each priest declared.

1. The second Vatican Council defined the diocesan framework as being superior to the parish within the pastoral domain (Vallier, 1969). The result is that a theology based on the priest’s “diocesanity” developed or was more widely circulated, and since then, an enhanced “diocesan conscience”.

12. Forming pastoral teams is right up this alley, since it allows a priest to be locally confronted to a limited number of interlocutors. Clearly, his local relations are not restricted to them alone, but they make it easier to manage the parish collectively.
Rather than seeing a single chain of command emerge due to all the social resources being concentrated in the same hands, several profiles emerge when we combine our analysis of the exchange system and the priests’ centrality scores. In the first place, members of the hierarchy, who all naturally have diocesan responsibilities, are very central in collaboration, advice and personal support. They declare few or no pastoral projects, having no parish appointment, or if they do, doubtless no time to develop many. Secondly, about ten young priests are central in the different exchange systems, more especially for advice and particularly in their own social niche. Being identified with a religious offer, they declare a large number of well-defined pastoral projects. They call themselves and are often called spokesmen (“loud-mouths”) in the diocese. They participate in at least one diocesan activity, though not always formally. Approximately ten other priests, young and less young, who also belong to a social niche, turn out to be relatively central most of all in matters of conviviality and personal support. Some of these priests are reputed “serious” or “wise”, i.e. known to be good listeners and well informed about the diocese. As to the other priests, a large number declare few projects and have no diocesan responsibility. Local stability and nearing retirement are two factors that allow us to detect priests whose status remains local. Parish priests in the large parishes present other characteristics: the large number of projects they declare (their parish being sufficiently well off for them to do so) goes along with very little interaction with their fellow-priests. They are busy either building a local status or one outside the diocese.

The result of status competition among priests can also be read in the relational structure apparent in Fig. 1. For, if one looks more closely at the exchange system, there is an unmistakable opposition between a center and a periphery in the way position 1 relates to positions 6 and 7. Going from the center to the periphery is gradual. The progression can be visualized as strata: mentions both made and received thin out as one moves away from the center, and resorting exclusively to formal organization becomes apparent as one approaches the periphery. Members of the hierarchy, regrouped in position 1 form the core around which social niches 2 and 4 gravitate, niches 3 and 5 to a lesser extent, and finally positions 6 and 7. Each stratum can be interpreted as a degree of integration in the diocese. Being at the sending and receiving end of a great number of citations, participating in a social niche and possessing a diocesan title can thus be correlated.

The relational structure, and the interdependencies and oppositions that it reveals, explain why the diversity of religious offers does not end in open conflict. On one hand, it is the result of two relational strategies typical of collegial organizations: looking for or creating social niches and competing for status among peers. However, the more collegial the exchange system among priests, the more accessing a position such as e.g. bishop’s vicar demands being able to play the game of unity and finding priests who want to attain positions of responsibility to promote their own beliefs. In turn, the bishop counts on status competition to identify the leaders he will co-opt and negotiate an agreement with on the most consensual positions and practices possible.

5. Top down collegiality: the bureaucratic management of the diversity of Catholic offers

If bottom up collegiality depends on a form of specialization in various domains—in conceiving diverse and often opposed religious offers for instance—which makes it easier to grasp the diversity of Catholic identities (Donégani, 2000), then the risk that a church might explode is real (Willaime, 1986, 1992). The story of the Catholic Church is punctuated by tensions with groups, movements or associations capable of provoking serious schisms. In order to manage diversity and preserve unity, the Church proceeded to establish an administrative and cultural bureaucracy by creating
a hierarchy\textsuperscript{13} that stands for unity even if it is only a front, and by standardizing symbols easy to communicate and identify. However, the contemporary context of the Catholic Church in France demands that priorities be redefined and new norms for religious activity negotiated. The bishop has the authority to make such decisions but there remains doubts as to their efficiency, both internally (being obeyed by subordinates of the current generation of priests for whom defection is a serious option) and with regard to the global society where democratic values prevail. In general, relations between the Church and French society seem uncertain and diminish the effectiveness of an organization and decision-making processes, which are merely bureaucratic. Henceforth, the decision-making process is partly determined by the hierarchy’s acceptance of relative autonomy for the rank and file and the search for consensus with the support of religious expertise\textsuperscript{14}. Organizing diocesan synods is the perfect example of the coexistence between the monocratic leader of a diocesan administration on one hand, and, on the other, the lower echelons coordinated in bottom up collegial fashion, whose largest possible participation in decision-making is solicited\textsuperscript{15}.

Thus, the unity of the Catholic Church largely depends on the bishop’s work. The complexity of a pastoral activity divided into different religious offers makes direct control by a monocratic authority difficult. The diocesan services contribute to elaborating the norms that govern pastoral activity and participate in the initial training and continuing education of religious actors. Their participation in defining the rules for religious activity can create conflict with the priests, who can criticize the bishop for treading on their toes—e.g. when it comes to catechism, deciding on the curriculum or the age for first communion. Relations between diocesan services and priests can be compared to the relationship between administration and professionals. The diversity and need for coordination translate in the fact that organizing diocesan responsibilities is primarily entrusted to priests. A bishop is supposed to represent the unity of the diocese but his own convictions cause him to give one component of the diocese precedence over another. Nevertheless, it may be in his interest to confer diocesan responsibilities on the various representatives of religious offers “equitably”. In so doing, he is promoting a hard-line, typically “Catholic” strategy that aims to integrate a maximum of diversity in exchange for the integrated elements’ toning down their own convictions. On the other hand, a strategy of that sort—which we observed in the diocese—reinforces the interdependence between the bishop and the priests’ exchange system, so that decision-making is necessarily collective, implying that the other religious actors—permanent deacons or lay people—also be included.

In organizational terms, it now becomes crucial to identify the members who adopt one or several forms of endogenous status described above. The bishop’s co-optation of the most central colleagues in matters of collaboration, advice and personal support, as well as the most visible representatives of the various religious offers, means that collegiality is being transformed into a tool for management. Formally, a bishop’s action at the head of the diocese depends on his collaborating directly with three types of actors: the members of the Episcopal council—among whom the Grand Vicar and the district Episcopal vicars—the diocesan services and the diocesan

\textsuperscript{13} In the diocese we examined, the priests’ hierarchical organization was the following: vicar–parish priest–dean–Episcopal vicar–vicar general–bishop. Deans are not necessarily seen as part of the hierarchy by the priests who habitually refer directly to the Episcopal vicar.

\textsuperscript{14} These factors were highlighted by members of the hierarchy, priests or lay members of the diocesan services. They were apparently actually applied—when setting up “pastoral teams” for example—to the point that some priests regretted that the bishop did not sometimes make his decisions alone.

\textsuperscript{15} See for example the volume directed by Jacques Palard (1997).
councils. The latter are usually purely consultative, though voting procedures are applied e.g. during sessions of the Presbyteral council. They allow every type of actor—priests, deacons, monks and nuns, lay people—to participate to a greater or lesser extent in the bishop’s decision-making.\footnote{Observing several sessions of Presbyteral council meetings confirmed the reality of their deliberations: actual discussions and possibilities of expressing disagreement.}

Eventually, the Episcopal council is where decisions are made and important diocesan orientations determined. The council includes Episcopal vicars who play an important role as regards the priests for they advise the bishop in affairs concerning parish appointments and the distribution of diocesan mandates. Theoretically, they oversee and evaluate priests’ work.\footnote{At the time of the survey, members of the hierarchy were directing that activity towards evaluating priests’ performance, by debating how to go about it. Controlling conformity with a pastoral model only makes sense for the generalist, not the specialized, register of his activity.} We must remember that at the time of our research the diocese was made up of four pastoral zones whose borders had been traced in the 1970s. Each at that time was homogeneous from a social and professional point of view: one was traditionally bourgeois, one working-class, one a new town and one a rural area. Each pastoral zone was headed by an Episcopal vicar appointed by the bishop to organize the assignment of priests to the area and set up zone days during which most of the persons officially involved in pastoral activity met: priests, permanent deacons, lay members of the pastoral team or the chaplaincy. Those special days were built around themes such as the relationship to politics or Judaism, or were opportunities for members of the pastoral team to exchange and compare their experiences. Each zone was composed of deaneries (16 in all), pastoral sections or groups of parishes. Every three years, each deanery elected a dean from its ranks, theoretically to watch over his colleagues but who in fact represented another relay for the bishop. This permitted the latter to summon the deans to yearly meetings. Pastoral sectors are what remain of the teamwork pastoral actors aimed to put into practice during the 1970s. Today they are the starting point for creating groups of parishes. At the time of our survey, the diocese was made up of 45 groups of parishes and 53 parishes.

A hierarchal system of committees—the Episcopal, Presbyteral and pastoral diocesan councils in particular—is thus created top down to allow the bishop to direct the diocese from above while translating into more general terms the priests’ specialized, locally collegial approaches. The distribution of diocesan responsibilities is based partly on criteria connected to the priest’s informal status: decision-making in the diocese and in the parishes is imbued with a modern rationality that depends on profane competences and religious expertise (diplomas, experience). The creation and multiplication of diocesan services, supposed to be in the avant-garde of a religious domain composed of specialists (catechism, training...), is an example of how demand for rationality increases. Secondly, when one considers the way Episcopal zone vicars and deans are appointed, clearly the informal recognition of priests by their peers plays an important role, for the bishop nominates the dean or Episcopal vicar at the end of a consultative vote.\footnote{That, in any case, is the way the bishop, newly established at the time of our study, decided to operate. According to his close advisers, he systematically offered the assignment to the priest who had obtained the largest number of votes. It nevertheless remains that canonically speaking the bishop can appoint more or less whomever he pleases.}

Top down collegiality considered under that angle is precisely the way Max Weber defined it.\footnote{“[... There is absolutely nothing ‘democratic’ about collegiality. When the privileged classes had to guard themselves against the threat of those who were negatively privileged, they were always obliged to avoid, in this way, allowing any monocratic, seigneurial power that might count on those strata to arise.” (Weber, 1978, p. 362).} It is adjustable and suits diocesan situations that involve bishop, priests and lay people; for it does not mean that the hierarchy has eased its pressure on the lower ranks. For instance, at the time
of our study, the hierarchy had installed a local “pastoral team”, a collective managerial organ to replace the parish priest’s individual leadership. It was comprised of the parish priest, often the vicars, and three to five lay members generally elected by the parish. The lay members are however designated by the bishop by way of an official letter of assignment and “installed” for a three-year period by the zone’s Episcopal vicar. That nomination procedure fuels the priests’ fear they will lose their traditional privileges and see a hierarchy parallel to theirs develop. Bottom up collegiality among priests may then resemble a defense mechanism directed against top down collegiality, weigh on the decisions of the monocratic leader personified by the bishop, and, through specific exchanges, bolster the priests’ particular identity compared to lay people’s.20

6. The micro-political overlap of the two faces of collegiality

To make some headway on the problem of how managers and professionals relate to each other, we moved the discussion over towards the question of how two organizational forms—collegiality and bureaucracy—interrelated, then over to the two definitions of collegiality. The case presented in this article has allowed us to clarify the contemporary understanding of Weber’s theory of collegiality. We propose in fact that collegiality, as a particular form of organization is really a bottom up type of collegiality, based on carrying out uncertain, non-routine tasks collectively among rival peers. In the case under study, it takes the form of conceiving and promoting religious offers (conveying different, if not conflicting, conceptions of priestly professionalism), through an informal division of labor between offers that are difficult to arrange in any hierarchical order among the organization’s priorities. Such an informal division of labor creates interdependencies and depends on a specific social discipline that helps members keep up their active cooperation and commitment as well as certain forms of consensus. The priests’ exchange system allows measuring that discipline and also reveals the fact that creating consensus is facilitated by forming an oligarchy, in our case a limited number of priest “spokesmen” for religious offers capable of playing the role of intermediaries. The double endogenous structure bears witness to the fact that a specific collegial organizational form does actually exist.

This form of bottom up collegiality is different from the one constructed by a hierarchy in an already bureaucratic context, i.e. collegiality as a tool for management, which we have called top down collegiality. In the best of cases, the latter identifies the affinity niches of bottom up collegiality as “collegial pockets” that emerge in the organization. In top down collegiality, the members of the committees assisting the official leader are chosen with an eye to gaining support for policies that can be decided autocratically as well as through discussion. From the perspective of bureaucratic management, bottom up collegiality is often an insignificant “micro-collegiality” responsible for conflicts and problems of integration that “macro-collegiality” can solve. We consider the latter a “bureau-collegiality”. In all more or less bureaucratic organizations calling upon expertise, i.e. in a large proportion of contemporary organizations, both forms of collegiality—bottom up and top down—coexist in that way.

Bureaucracy and collegiality coexist in a context combining an endogenous system of niches and statuses on one side, and a bishop, a hierarchical structure and a diocesan administration on the other. Concerning the problems of integration encountered in his diocese, a bishop can seek to ignore them; the priests themselves may not feel obliged to welcome the different tendencies and conceptions of professionalism present. Everything can depend on the social strength of the

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20 At the time of our study, it was striking to see that some priests wanted to bypass the organization of deanery and zone meetings, which usually brought together priests and lay people, by organizing sessions attended exclusively by priests.
exchange system, i.e. on the priests’ social origins (Bourdieu and de Saint Martin, 1982) but also on the size and structure of their network: a small number of isolated priests carry much less weight than a large number of priests united by their interdependencies and by a certain form of “bounded solidarity”.

The way in which the two types of collegiality interrelate, through the micro-political selection of representatives of the endogenous system and through assigning them responsibilities, is the result of a fairly flexible method. Problems begin, as often happens, when the bureaucratic authority, or “rational decision-maker”, forgets the reasons why a bottom up type of endogenous collegiality even exists—the complex, uncertain and non-routine nature of tasks and the joint definition of a form of professionalism—and imposes a single definition of collegiality, the one that reinforces his/her purely formal and centralized authority to the detriment of his/her role as an arbitrator, integrator and consensus-builder. In the best of cases, bureaucrats may respect the bottom up collegial organization and integrate its different representatives at the managerial level, including in the deliberative organs typically composed of different actors and members of competing groups, in a dynamic move of adjustment and control. At worst, they will completely ignore the endogenous form of organization, regain control of the organization without adjustment, make autocratic decisions, routinize and standardize tasks. Collegiality is in that case used only as a top down tool for management within the framework of a very narrow form of rationalization. Managers who do not know the nature of the tasks carried out by their staff will thus bureaucratize and destroy the creativity of their members and the capacity of the organization to adapt. Reducing collegiality to the existence of councils in the upper strata means that the entire social organization of labor that we have termed bottom up collegiality is ignored. By extension, in between the two extreme strategies, autocratic bureaucrats can also implement top down collegiality in a way that appears to be collegial but actually make structural decisions “on the sly”; they may for instance take note of the local opinion leaders and those with responsibilities but make it difficult and costly for some to attend by ostracizing them or putting obstacles in their way—e.g. by scheduling deliberations on dates that are never convenient or reimbursing official travel expenses for some and not others, etc. By organizing a theoretically well-balanced composition and a deliberately poorly balanced practice, the semblance of collegiality is preserved, but in a bureaucratic and autocratic spirit that is hardly compatible with carrying out non-standard tasks and innovation (Mignot-Gérard, 2006 and Musselin, 1990).

The range of strategies available for coordinating bottom up and top down collegiality is therefore fairly large. The first step is choosing members of social niches to sit on executive councils. According to the level of rationalization implemented, the transformation of collegiality into a means of management may either constantly refine the relationship between the two types of collegiality, or forego bottom up collegiality, keeping only the rhetoric21, thus often paralyzing cooperation between experts and between peers. The problem posed by the ubiquity of contemporary “bureau-collegiality” concerns an increasing number of institutions: hospitals, universities,

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21 Studying the bishop’s formal system of integration does not mean that he does not use less formal mechanisms, e.g. drawing on his own personal network. Since the bishop did not wish to answer the network questionnaire, we are only able to examine the formal integration of the “collegial pockets” system. In the case at hand, the bishop did not originally come from the diocese; he had been installed recently and had little personal contact with the priests, which accounts for the important place occupied by the vicar general’s relations, himself chosen because of his extensive familiarity with the priests. The fact the bishop did not wish to expose his personal relations in the diocese shows the importance attributed to the process of formal management constituted by top down collegiality, even if it is unable to do away with the sociologist’s fascination with other, more informal procedures of integration that depend on personal networks.
research institutes, political groups, etc. It is the renewed expression of an older and more profound question about the latitude and freedom of expertise and about professionals when they organize their work, notwithstanding the many restrictions–economic or political–confronting them.

Acknowledgements

Our thanks to Bruno Duriez for his constructive suggestions.

Appendix 1. Four name generators which allowed us to reconstitute the social networks of the priests in the diocese

Questions bearing on exchanges between priests—“name generators”—were particularly delicate both when collecting and when processing data. The questions called for nominative responses, which meant that it was necessary to obtain, even more than when administering a classic questionnaire, the bishop’s green light and respondents’ trust regarding our presence in the field, the way we presented the study, and how the questions were phrased. Answers were collected using alphabetical lists of priests’ names.

Collaboration: “To allow me to understand how priests work together, I would like to know with what other priests you collaborated over the past year, both in your work in the parish and outside, and in the diocese. By collaboration, I mean exchanges that helped build up a pastoral project, a job you carried out together”.

Advice: “Over the past year, when you had to make an important decision in the course of your various pastoral activities, which of the priests on this list did you consult when you needed an outside opinion? Colleagues you trust and whom you consult even when the matter at hand does not concern them directly? Colleagues whose opinion you seek in all confidence.”

Conviviality: “Over the past year, with which of your colleagues did you share pleasant moments? A leisure activity, for instance, or going away on vacation together. Or colleagues you like sitting around the table with. Just to have a good time.”

Personal support: “Among the priests on this list, could you point out those with whom over the past year you discussed the more personal aspect of your mission?”

Appendix 2. Density tables associated with the exchange system

| Density table for the collaboration network (average density = 0.15) |
|---------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Position 1 | Position 2 | Position 3 | Position 4 | Position 5 | Position 6 | Position 7 | ‘Residual’ set |
| Position 1 | 0.833 | 0.357 | 0.245 | 0.429 | 0.143 | 0.065 | 0.199 | 0.286 |
| Position 2 | 0.393 | 0.629 | 0.357 | 0.260 | 0.125 | 0.091 | 0.063 | 0.130 |
| Position 3 | 0.184 | 0.429 | 0.381 | 0.143 | 0.014 | 0.039 | 0.056 | 0.086 |
| Position 4 | 0.571 | 0.292 | 0.161 | 0.643 | 0.275 | 0.068 | 0.106 | 0.313 |
| Position 5 | 0.257 | 0.175 | 0.029 | 0.300 | 0.500 | 0.145 | 0.048 | 0.150 |
| Position 6 | 0.273 | 0.061 | 0.065 | 0.148 | 0.236 | 0.218 | 0.072 | 0.153 |
| Position 7 | 0.247 | 0.066 | 0.052 | 0.133 | 0.064 | 0.052 | 0.049 | 0.095 |
| ‘Residual’ set | 0.393 | 0.151 | 0.071 | 0.281 | 0.194 | 0.108 | 0.081 | 0.163 |
### Density table for the advice network (average density = 0.05)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position 1</th>
<th>Position 2</th>
<th>Position 3</th>
<th>Position 4</th>
<th>Position 5</th>
<th>Position 6</th>
<th>Position 7</th>
<th>'Residual' set</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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### Density table for the conviviality network (average density = 0.06)

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<th>Position 3</th>
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<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.518</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 5</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.511</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.245</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position 7</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Density table for the personal support network (average density = 0.03)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position 1</th>
<th>Position 2</th>
<th>Position 3</th>
<th>Position 4</th>
<th>Position 5</th>
<th>Position 6</th>
<th>Position 7</th>
<th>'Residual' set</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Position 1</td>
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<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.009</td>
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<td>0.371</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.003</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.214</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.004</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>0.025</td>
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<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.400</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.036</td>
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<td>0.003</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.003</td>
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<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.006</td>
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### References


Selznick P. 1957. Leadership in Administration, Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson and Co.


