

inherent in the (otherwise laudable and all too rare) effort to center domestic politics within a macrostructural political-economic framework are on display throughout, especially where the analysis moves from the “macro” to the “micro”—that is, to the decisions, orientations, and actions of specific persons, in specific times and places, on which details are sometimes sparse.

Such concerns are ideally bases of the kind of extended, critical conversation that a book like this deserves, and that the author surely would have welcomed. For my part, I would have liked to know whether COVID, which arguably widened the Overton window in ways *First-Class Passengers* does not anticipate, impacted his assessment of reform’s impossibility. Instead all we can do is continue in the historical and critical tradition of which Richard Lachmann was a valued exemplar, appreciate the insights of his analysis, and take seriously the importance of the message: tether the lifeboats and ground the spaceships, before it’s too late.

Bureaucracy, Collegiality and Social Change: Redefining Organizations with Multilevel Relational Infrastructures. By Emmanuel Lazega. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2020. Pp. xi+341. \$145.00.

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The first impression that one will probably have in reading chapter 1 of Emmanuel Lazega’s *Bureaucracy, Collegiality and Social Change: Redefining Organizations with Multilevel Relational Infrastructures* is that it is ambitious. The title of the book is rich with indications that this perspective means the approach is structural, or what the author calls “neo-structural.” The book is an anchor to the Oxford University Press series Social Networks, Organizations and Markets, edited by Lazega, Rafael Wittek, and Tom Snijders, that aims to apply “a network perspective to provide a new understanding of the organizational and market society.”

While too long to be a manifesto, the book makes the point that a structural perspective has a lot to offer organizational sociology and institutional sociology on the question of social change. By tracing Lazega’s work over more than two decades, the project is quite clear: construct a structural and sociological theory of organization that consists morphologically (Lazega’s preferred word) of multilevels, distinct from each other yet correlated through relationships and people, some of whom act as linchpins. The study is not didactically friendly, is sparse in figures and tables, is occasionally repetitive, and has a penchant to rely on abstruse metaphors and jargon. Still, at the end of the book, the reader bows before the recognition that the struggle was not in vain, and progress on the ambition admirably advanced.

Lazega relies heavily on Weber’s legacy to motivate his theoretical perspective, although this choice comes at a cost. At the heart of the book are three

words that appear in the title that express the analytical perspective that Lazega pursues, namely, *bureaucracy*, *collegiality*, and *multilevel*. The first two words denote two opposing forces within an organization. The first force draws directly from Weber's development of bureaucracy and routinization of rationality that he saw as the characteristic of modernity. As bureaucracy for Weber, and for many sociologists who followed, has a strong relation with the modern corporation, the term is a key element in Lazega's theorization for the hierarchization of authority into multilevels, a core structural focal point developed throughout the book.

Lazega's second force is collegiality. Lazega rescues the concept of collegiality to serve in contraposition to bureaucracy, an idea adumbrated by Weber and that he understood as the willingness to cooperate among peers. Lazega sees the limitations to this bloodless definition and takes it rather in the direction as a social affinity within expert groups that tend to generate relational structures allied with common values. Collegiality therefore plays a vital role in supporting collective action, and when called upon, new agreements by which social chance is achieved.

Jointly, bureaucracy and collegiality represent, respectively, macro and micro properties of his structural approach. Here one sees the costs to being overly wedded to Weberian roots rather than constructing the ideas ab initio that would have permitted a more straightforward contribution to organizational theory. I am thinking not so much about James Coleman's macro-micro dynamic, however relevant, as about the many models that treat organizations as dynamic networks propelled by the opposition of global connectivity and the density of micro local affinities. Examples of these kinds of dynamics bring to mind the implications of small world structures balanced between connectivity and locality or the precariousness of possible evolutionary paths for organizational networks to veer toward creativity or stalemate. For the most part, the construction of these bridges to a less Weberian-laden structural sociology awaits another occasion.

To the contrary, Lazega's discussion of multilevel structures is promising and innovative, and he sets out to demonstrate the opportunities to theorize about multilevel organizations. Narrowly construed, multilevel might mean for many readers the statistical approach to structural modeling of data describing actors and their behaviors as positional in regard to the bureaucratic hierarchy. For example, a corporation consists of a corporate upper level "C suite" (e.g., chief executive officer, chief financial officer, etc.) and decentralized businesses or middle managers. However, these top managers also create structural relationships with managers at lower levels as well as with individuals and organizations external to their organization.

Paraphrasing, Lazega's interest is to provide a neostructural interpretation to organizations, thereby integrating organizations and institutions within a similar multilevel perspective. He advises, and here I paraphrase from page 41, that "thinking multilevel" first means looking at organizations as composed by superposed levels of collective agency. He introduces the important concept of coconstitutional, or agreement between these two ideal-types of collegial

and bureaucratic and how they interact between levels or sometimes between organizations, recognizing that levels, or organizations, collaborate and seek to coordinate actions through collective agency. By leaving room for agency in negotiating between these two regimes of bureaucratic and collegial, he allows for the role of linchpins to bridge the relational structures of each level. There is a Burt-like potential to this part of the argument pointing to structural holes that Lazega recognizes and references.

Still, with the encumbrance of superposition, the reader is likely to have the impression of the final days in the collapse of empire, a view that Lazega seems to hold. That Lazega's empathies lie in the direction of collegial autonomy is evident in his empirical work that is the basis of the first five-sixths of the book. The final and sixth chapter takes greater license to speculate on the moral contradictions between collegiality and bureaucratic accountability.

This chapter contains a fascinating characterization of changes in the organizing of battlefield units in the field to illustrate radically organizing by collegiality and autonomy through a process of self-organizing swarming of units. This example sets a polar standard by the following comparison to the bureaucratic nightmare of overly powerful governments and tech companies. It portrays the top-down effects by a few large firms that drown the bottom-up collegial autonomy, with the directionality part of Lazega's nomenclature. The argument promisingly opens a vista on governance and the struggle for power and control. In one of the book's rare concessions to the cultural tradition in French sociology (p. 248), Lazega, unexpectedly, adopts from Foucault the concept of governmentality to speculate on the portentous consequences of immense power held by public government and private actors.

It's a moment of exhalation as the argument approaches the edge of this speculation that culture has an explanatory role to play too, a return to the idealistic dimension of Weber, who after all is the author of the *Protestant Ethic*. Lazega pulls in the reins, preferring to emphasize that technology (e.g., sensors, robotization, AI) enhances bureaucratization and subordinates collegiality and relational affiliations to powerful methods of control. Thus, technology is the engine of social change, an unintended conclusion but well anticipated by the prior analysis. In this sense, Lazega's thinking is more Orwellian than Marxist and less a critique of capitalism and markets than a resignation to exogenous technological forces that empower the state regardless of institutional and ideological differences.

Those who like happy endings might have left more potential to the institutional structures that protect political cultural resilience as a source for defying at least negative social change. A good example to consider are cultural sociologists, for example, Paul DiMaggio, who have eagerly sought to integrate Bourdieu and the concept of fields with networks as an avenue to break the ineluctable theorization of social control as a surrender to technological advances. Yet, Lazega's own studies on courts and collegiality point in the direction of culture as normative orders. One wonders if Lazega had more methodologically organized his empirical studies and cases to prove his

theoretical implications, would his logic have treated more directly the question of social change in relation to the varieties of possible institutional outcomes. That's a big ask of an already very ambitious study that succeeds in providing the analytical conceptual and methodological tools that those undertaking the subsequent intellectual journey will find useful. That's a happy ending anyone should like.

Panic City: Crime and the Fear Industries in Johannesburg. By Martin J. Murray. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2020. Pp. xxix+353. \$90.00 (cloth); \$30.00 (paper).

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“What does it mean to inhabit a city gripped by suspicion and fear” (p. xx) where people are obsessed by security? This is one of the questions that animates this dystopic, meticulously researched, and brilliantly written book, *Panic City: Crime and the Fear Industries in Johannesburg*. Martin J. Murray argues that apartheid's “afterlife” in Johannesburg (one of South Africa's largest cities) has resurfaced in the shape of a “renewed obsession with danger” (p. xi) on the part of the affluent (mostly white) and middle classes. Using terms such as “siege architecture” and “fear industries,” he argues that an “oversaturation” of “signs of vulnerability” has produced a “constant state of collective panic” (p. xii) or “culture of fear” (p. xii), which constructs “phantasmagoric Otherness” (p. 26)—in the form of the homeless, foreigners, sex workers, itinerant job seekers, poor black men, and so on. “Routine performance[s] of bordering” (p. 141) in pursuit of securitization through fortification of private homes (via CCTV cameras, sentry posts, electric fences, and security guards), cordoning off of private streets (via illegally erected booms and gates), and heavily armed mobile policing patrols impede the mobility of the racialized poor and play a territorializing role, producing “enclosed spaces” (p. xiv) where the affluent sequester themselves from the dangerous “outside.” Thus, urban space is divided into “fragmented regimes of security governance” where the rule of law is suspended and “arbitrary force” is meted out (p. 11).

It is impossible to do justice to the breadth and depth of Murray's writing in a short review. Suffice it to say that the book engages with a variety of disciplinary fields, including critical criminology, urban geography, bordering, and the sociology of punishment. It contains a wealth of deeply disturbing data. Even though policing in South Africa (SA) was always a hybridized and pluralistic affair, this has become more marked in the formally democratic “post-” apartheid period. Murray argues that the “fear industries” produce the insecurity that they claim to protect against. At 500,000, the number of active security officers in SA is more than twice the size of its Police Service (SAPS), bigger than both the SAPS and defense force combined, and the